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The Navy's Manpower and Personnel system is currently undergoing a great deal of stress 
and change. The 1990s personnel drawdown has created a strain on the system, exhibited externally 
through changes to the fleet billet structure which must be managed by the manpower and personnel 
system, and internally manifested in the corresponding increase in workload of the remaining 
personnel. i In addition, the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) committee decision to 
relocate the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) to Millington, Tennessee has splintered the 
organization as several agencies have remained behind in Washington D.c. 
This purpose of this thesis is to conduct an analysis ofNl3, the Military (Navy) Personnel 
Plans and Policy Division, an organization greatly affected by these events. N13 has a major impact 
on fleet manning and individual sailors, and faces the considerable challenge of formulating and 
implementing innovative solutions while under numerous constraints. Attention is currently focused 
on N13 as recruiting and retention difficulties have contributed to a predicted FY98 Navy End 
strength shortfall? Solutions that have been applied in the past (more money and personnel) are no 
longer readily available and N13 must now look at other ways to solve emerging issues and 
reoccurring problems. This analysis uses several models to view N13 from different perspectives 
and provide a framework for making systematic change. 
B. MEmODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a four-step approach to analyzing N13. First, relevant organizational and 
management literature is reviewed to provide the tools necessary for the analysis. Next, a context 
1 Since 1989, the United States Navy has reduced Active Duty erid strength by 36 percent, reducing manning by almost 
200,000 Sailors. 
2 The N13 Enlisted Strength Planner predicts that the Navy will come in 5,000 below FY98 congressionally mandated end 
strength. This is largely due to CNRC' s predicted shortfall of about 7,000 accessions. 
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for understanding the N13 organization is provided through a description of the manpower and 
personnel system. A detailed, current description of N13 is conducted. Finally, conclusions and 
recommendations for improvements are provided based on model comparisons, document reviews, 
questionnaire responses, and personal interviews. The methodology is summarized follows: 
models: 
(1) An organizational design and management literature review was conducted. 
(2) An overview of the manpower and personnel system was conducted based on: 
• Semi-structured interviews 
• Briefing documents 
• Training course documents 
• Organizational literature 
(3) N13 was described based on: 
• Briefings and literature specific to N13. 
• 7 Enlisted Community Manager (ECM) responses to a formal questionnaire 
• 16 semi-structured interviews with N13 leaders and managers. 
(4) N13 was analyzed based on document reviews, interviews, and comparisons to three 
• Mintzberg's model: Defines the basic shape ofan organization. 
• Systems model: Views all the organizational components holistically. 
• Configuration model: Places an organization into one of four basic types 
based on extent or focus on efficiency and effectiveness. 
C. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
The analysis of N13 depicts an organization stressed due to personnel reductions and a 
partial relocation of BUPERS to Millington, Tennessee. The study points out how N13 is 
struggling to cope with fast-changing 1990s problems using a post Cold War, Political-Reactive 
configuration. The study describes organizational problems and offers a systematic approach for 
change. Specific areas for improvement are also discussed as a starting point for dialogue in N13 
and the manpower and personnel system. F or example, the need for strategic thinking and 
2 
communication of a meaningful strategy for change linked to direct actions is discussed. 
Realignment to a team-based, community approach, vice the current fragmented and duplicative 
approach, might yield more concentrated focus on problem solving. Additionally, the creation of a 
realistic training program for carefully selected incoming personnel would improve organizational 
learning and performance. The most far-reaching benefit is for a genuine discussion to emerge 
centered on achievable transformation for N13 and other challenged organizations. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II discusses the organizational theory and models used as the basis for analysis. 
Chapter III provides the necessary context for readers unfamiliar with the manpower and personnel 
system. Chapter IV describes the N13 organization. Chapter V uses the models discussed in 
Chapter II and the organizational description in Chapter IV. Chapter VI discusses the major 
conclusions and provides recommendations for N13 and Navy manpower and personnel leadership. 
3 
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D. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND MODELS 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay a foundation of organizational theory and explain a 
Systems model and a Configuration model to management, which will be used to analyze N13 in 
Chapters V and VI. Mintzberg's organizational theory proposes basic structural designs and 
coordinating mechanisms of organizations. The Systems model builds on this by viewing an 
organization as the product of a group of interacting factors and elements. Next, a Configuration 
model, based on the level of efficiency and effectiveness found in public sector organizations, is 
. described. Finally, some organizational change considerations are proposed. 
A. MINTZBERG'S ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
Henry Mintzberg offers a comprehensive explanation of how organizations evolve into a 
certain form and shape. This "structure" is an adaptive mechanism that permits the organization to 
function in its surroundings. He proposes that organizations are composed of five main parts, as 
shown in Figure (2_1).3 
1. Operating Core: Workers at the base of an organization performing the basic work. 
2. Strategic Apex: Personnel charged with ensuring organizational effectiveness, 
oversight, and direction for the entire system. 
3. Middle Line: Managers linking the strategic apex to the operating core. Middle 
managers comprise organizational hierarchy. 
4. Technostructure: Analysts planning and controlling the work of others. They may 
design the work, plan it, or train the people who do it, but they typically do not do the 
work themselves. 
5. Support Staff: The support staff provides services to enable accomplishment of the 
basic mission. The support staff is not directed towards providing advice, as is the 
technostructure, rather its function is to assist other organizational components. 
3 Henry Min1zberg, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations, Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1992, p. 11. 
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Figure 2-1. Mintzberg's Basic Model ofan Organization 
The small strategic apex is connected by a flaring middle line to a large, flat operating core 
at the base. These three parts are drawn in an uninterrupted sequence to indicate that they are 
connected as a single line of authority. The technostructure and support staff are shown off to . 
either side to indicate that they are not a part of the main line of authority, and tend to influence the 
operating core indirectly. 4 
The parts of the organization require a means of coordinating work, based on the 
complexity. There are five mechanisms proposed to explain the various ways organizations may 
coordinate work. 
• Mutual adjustment: Achieves coordination of work by the process of inforinal : 
communication between employees. 
• Direct supervision: Achieves coordination by having one person take responsibility for 
the work of others. 
• Standardization of work processes: Standardized when the contents of work are 
specified. 
4 Henry Milltzberg,Mintzberg on Management, The Free Press: New York 1989, pp 98-99. 
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• Standardization of work output: Standardized when the results of the work are 
specified. 
• Standardization of skills and knowledge: Standardized when the kind of training 
required to perfonn the work is specified. 
These five mechanisms manifest themselves in a rough order. Mutual adjustment works in 
simplest and least complex fonns. Organizations cannot rely on just one of these mechanisms and 
many use all five. 5 As work becomes increasingly complex, an organization may use various 
combinations of these mechanisms. Organizations also rely on coordinating mechanisms to link 
individual and group efforts: (1) vertically, through commands, supervision, policies, rules, planning 
or control systems; and (2) laterally, through meetings, task forces, standing committees, or special 
coordinating roles. Vertical coordination is more fonnal in that managers control and coordinate 
work of subordinates. It is most prevalent when organizational environments are stable and tasks 
are predictable. Lateral coordination is more infonnal, in that workers at similar levels coordinate 
among themselves. This type of coordination dominates when organizational environments are 
turbulent and tasks are complex. 6 
By varying the emphasis on certain parts of the organizational structure and the means of 
coordination, five different types of structures have been proposed by Mintzberg based primarily on 
structure and coordination: simple structure, machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, 
divisionalized form, and adhocracy. In each configuration, a different coordinating mechanism is 
dominant, a different part of the organization plays the key role, and a different type of control is 
usoo. Table (2-1) summarizes the key differences. 7 
5 Paul Muchinsky, Psychology Applied to Work, (Brooks/Cole Publishing Company: Pacific Grove, California, 1997), p.254. 
6 Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal, Reframing Organizations, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1991, p. 57. 
7 Herny Mintzberg, Strncture in Fives, 1995, p. 153. 
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Structural Prime Coordinating Key Part of Type of Control 
Confi~uration Mechanism O~anization 
Simple Structure Direct Supervision Strategic Apex Vertical and horizontal 
centralization 
Machine Bureaucracy Standardization of Technostructure Limited horizontal 
work processes decentralization 
Professional Standardization of Operating Core Vertical and horizontal 
Bureaucracy skills decentralization 
Divisionalized Form Standardization of Middle Line Limited vertical 
outQuts decentralization 
Adhocracy Mutual adjustment Support staff or Selective decentralization 
operating core 
Table 2-1: Summary of Mintzberg , s Configurations 
B. SYSTEMS MODEL 
A systems approach looks at a set of organizational attributes (e.g. environment, mission, 
task, structure, technology, etc.) rather than individual attributes.8 The analysis in this thesis relies 
heavily on the Systems model shown in Figure (2_2).9 This model was derived from a similar 
model developed at Harvard Business School to define an organization as a system of interacting 
components. The Systems model begins with the contextual factors impacting organizations, then 
considers the various design variables influencing output and outcomes. 
8 Nancy Roberts, "Public Deliberations: An Alternative Approach to Crafting Policy and Setting Direction," Public 
Administration Review, 1997. 
9 Nancy Roberts, "The Systems Model," Naval Postgraduate School, unpublished, 1998. 
8 
.... --------------------------------------~----





(External to System) 
-Technological 
.. 
Key Success -Reactive? 
-Political? Factors 
-Efficient? 
What does it take the system 
-Effective? 
to be successful? 
-Collaborntive? 
.. 
System Direction -Goals Approach 
-Vision Approach 





Structure Processes! Subsystems 
Tasks -What are the basic groupings of activities anc 
-Human Resource Management 
people? (How are activities/tasks combined?) 
-Who is recruited and selected? 
-What are the basic tasks? -Are these groupings a good fit with the work Are we hiring the right kinds of 
-What specification is required? flow? people? 
-What differentiation is required? -How are the groupings integrated? What 
-How do we train and develop 
integrating devices are used? people and are our current efforts 
-Hierarchy? 
adequate? 
~ Technology -Task Forces? -What is rewarded and do they fit -Integrating Roles? the desired pattern of behavior? 
-Describe the work flow? -Integrating Departments? -Measurement and Controls, 
-What are the key interdependencies am ong -Matrix? Financial management 
the work units or activities in the work flow? -Networks? 
-How are people held accountable 
-Describe the physical facilities and for resources? 
equipment. 
People -Do these mechanisms of 
accountability produce the desired 
-Who are the people? patterns of behavior? 
-Describe their skills, knowledge, abilities? 
-Planning, Communication and 
Information Management 
-How do we plan? 
-How do we commilllicate? 
-How do we gather, process, 
distribute, and evaluate 
information? 
.. 
-What are -What are the -Does the 
-Does the 
the prevalent eHowis formal and culture impede 
culture fit Culture norms and conflict informal or facilitate 
values in managed? patterns of integration of 
the larger 
the system? interaction? effort? 
environment? 
.. 
-What does the system -How are 
-What are the 
Outputs outputs indicators of 
offer/produce in terms of goods or services 
measured? performance? 
* 
Outcomes -What are the implications/ -How are outputs interpreted in L-
consequences of outputs for stakeholders? view of the environment? 
Figure 2-2_ The Systems Model (Source: Nancy Roberts, Naval Postgraduate School, 1998.) 
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1. Context 
The model begins by examining the organization's context. According to Nadler and 
Tushman, the context comprises the elements that make up the "givens" facing an organization. 
These "givens" include: 10 
• Environment: Factors outside the organization such as individuals, groups, or other 
organizations that affect how the organization performs. The environment also includes 
the political, economic, social, and technological influences. When analyzing an 
organization, one must consider the factors in the environment and how they create 
demands, constraints, or opportunities. 
• Resources: The assets an organization has at its disposal such as employees, 
technology, capital, and information. 
• History: How the organization is influenced by its past is another element of context. It 
is important to understand the major stages in an organization's development, as well as 
the current impacts of past events. 
2. Key Success Factors 
What factors are required for the organization to be successful? Management must ask 
sufficient questions to ascertain the requirements essential for success. Each organization will have 
different success factors depending on its existing context. Key success factors for public sector 
org~tions are likely to be more numerous and perhaps more ambiguous than for private, for-
profit organizations. 11 
3. System Direction 
The next step is for the organization to determine the direction/strategy for the system. 
Management should determine this based on the context and success factors. The type of direction 
10 David Nadler and Michael Tuslunan, StrategiC Organizational Design. Scott Foresman, and Company: Glenview, lllinois, 
1988, p. 22p. 22-24. 
11 John Bryson, Strategic Planningfor Public and Nonprofit Organizations, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1995, p. 291. 
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will vary depending on the type of organization. For example, some may issue top-down directives 
and specific goals, while others will issue vision statements or guiding principles. 
4. Design Factors 
Design factors refer to individual organizational components, i.e., tasks, technology, 
structure, people, and processes/subsystems. Congruence among these design factors is often 
critical for organizational success. 
• Tasks: The nature of the work, the specification and differentiation required, are key 
factors when designing tasks. The assessment of the fit of other components depends to 
a large degree on an understanding of the nature of the tasks to be performed. 
• Technology: Technology is the process by which an organization converts inputs into 
outputs. 12 It also includes the interdependencies among the activities and individuals 
involved in the work flow as.well as the physical facilities and equipment. Information 
systems, while commonly assumed to be part of the technology, are not included in this 
component. 
• Structure: Structure is the basic groupings of activities and people. This includes the 
basic shape and coordinating mechanisms and also refers to integrating devices (i.e. 
hierarchy, task force, integrating roles and departments, matrix, networks) that are used 
to coordinate between the various groupings. 
• People: The knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) of the people are an important 
design factor. This also refers to the demographic background and experience of the 
workers. 
• Process/Subsystems: This design factor refers to: 
1. Human Resource Management (HRM): Human Resource policies and 
programs produce the talent that is required by the strategy and structure of the 
organization, generating the skills and mind-sets necessary to implement its 
12 Daniel Robey, Designing Organizations, A Macro Perspective, Richard hwin, Inc.: Homewood, lllinois, 1982, p. 98. 
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chosen direction.13 HRM deals with the selection, training, and development of 
the people to meet the needs of the organization. How people are rewarded is 
also part ofHRM. The purpose of the reward system is to align the goals of the 
employee with the goals of the organization. 
2. Measurement and Controls Financial Management: These are the mechanisms 
designed to hold individuals accountable for behavior and resources. This also 
includes perfonnance measures and budgetary controls. 
3. Planning, Communication and Infonnation Management: This proce~s deals 
with how the organization gathers, processes, distributes, and evaluates 
infonnation. This is where the infonnation systems fit into an organization's 
design. 
5. Culture 
The culture of an organization is an important factor to consider when analyzing an 
organization. Culture pertains to the prevalent nonns and values found in a system. One definition 
of culture is "a pattern of basic assumptions, invented, discovered, or developed by a group as it 
learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and integration- that has worked well enough 
to be considered valid, and therefore has to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to their problems.,,14 Another more succinct definition is "the 
way we do things around here.,,15 In a systems approach, culture must be analyzed in terms of 
whether it impedes or facilitates integration of effort within an organization. 
6. Outputs and Outcomes 
The organization's output refers to the things that the organization offers in tenns of goods 
and services. It is a measure of how well an organization meets its objectives and utilizes resources. 
The output is often based on the method of measurement and is typically the performance indicator 
13 Jay Galbraith, Designing Or;ganizations, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1995, p. 15. 
14 E. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership: A Dynamic View, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1985. 
15 M. Bower, The Will To Manage: Corporate Success Through Programmed Management, McGraw-Hill: New York, 1 %6. 
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for an organization. Outcomes deal with the implications and consequences that outputs have on 
stakeholders and how the outputs are interpreted in view of the environment. In order to be an 
integrated system, the outcomes must feedback to the environment and also to the design factors. 
A Systems model is useful when analyzing organizations because it shows the 
interrelationship between all the factors that influence an organization. The systems approach 
assumes that an organization can only be understood by looking at the sum of all parts and at the 
level of congruence between them. Congruence is the degree to which the system components 
interact and create interdependence between the parts. The parts of an organization can fit well 
together and function effectively, or they can fit poorly and lead to problems, dysfunction, and poor 
performance. The basis hypothesis of the congruence model is that organizations will be more 
effective the greater the congruence or fit between the major components. 16 
C. CONFIGURATION MODEL 
Organizations can be categorized into various configurations based on different criteria. In 
this context, configuration refers to organizational attributes (e.g. environment, strategy, structure, 
tasks) that fall into a coherent pattern. Nancy Roberts has developed a Configuration model for 
public sector organizations based on the level of efficiency and effectiveness found in the 
organization. 17 (A study on public and private sector organizations is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Management cannot necessarily apply private sector management principles to the public 
sector to ensure success. 18) A Configuration model is especially applicable to public sector 
organizations, such as N13, that are designed to ful:fi11 missions, meet numerous mandates, and 
satisfy diverse constituents. 19 
16 Nadler and Tushrnan, Strategic Organizational Design. Scott Foresman, and Company, 1988, p. 22. 
17 Nancy Roberts, "Organizational Configuration: FolU" Approaches to Public Sector General Management," 1998, pp. 4-5. 
18 P. Nutt and R. Backoff, Strategic Management of Public and Third Sector Organizations," Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 
1992,. pp. 22-23 
19 John Bryson" Strategic Planningfor Public and Nonprofit Organizations, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1995. p ix. 
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1. Efficiency vs. Effectiveness 
Efficiency refers to the capacity to produce results with the minimum expenditure of time, 
money, or materials. It focuses on getting things done quicker and cheaper by refining and 
standardizing processes. Organizations based primarily on efficiency tend to survive best only when 
change is slow or predictable. 
Effectiveness is "bringing about a desired result." Managers must rely on adaptation to 
react to changes in the environment. Innovation is needed to effectively adapt to change and meet 
emergent needs of the organization and its stakeholders. Organizations with a high degree of 
effectiveness often ignore costs and time, and tend to function best under rapid change. 
Both effectiveness and efficiency are necessary in public sector performance, but each tends 
to interfere with the other. Efficiency tends to drive out change and innovation as it depends on 
repetition and precision. On the other hand, effectiveness thrives on exploration and 
experimentation. 20 
2. Public Sector Configurations 
Depending on the level of effectiveness and efficiency, organizations fall into one of four 
configurations as shown in Figure (2-3). An understanding of each of these four managerial 
approaches provides a blueprint of where an organization is currently located and can also guide 
management in choosing a new direction. 
20 Roberts, N., 1998, pp. 5-6. 
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Figure 2-3. Four Approaches to Public Sector General Management 
a. Directive Configuration 
The Directive Configuration is designed for higher levels of efficiency and lower 
levels of effectiveness. These highly centralized organizations try to minimize disturbances to the 
process and focus on becoming a "well-oiled machine." This results in little discretion left to the 
workers due to high levels of standardization and formalization. The key in this organization is the 
technostructure, which works to standardize processes. The role of the leader is to be the strategic 
planner and controller of the organization who issues top-down directives when faced with changing 
routines or procedures. 
b. Adaptive Configuration 
The Adaptive Configuration is the polar opposite of the Directive Configuration. 
Where, the Directive Configuration is concerned primarily with efficiency and performance, the 
Adaptive Configuration places its major emphasis on effectiveness and problem solving. This is a 
very flexible structure with few formalized rules for behavior. This configuration relies on a 
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decentralized group of experts who often work in teams responding directly to customer needs. 
Coordination is provided through mutual adjustment between the experts. The role of the leader is 
to be the champion of innovation. They must rely on a general vision of the future rather than on 
specific goals and objectives. They must be masters of human relations, able to use persuasion, 
negotiation, coalition, reputation and rapport to fuse the individualistic experts into smoothly 
functioning teams?l Research and Development organizations are examples of Adaptive 
configurations. 
c. PoliticallReactive Configuration 
The PoliticaI/Reactive organization resolves the tension between efficiency and 
effectiveness by reducing the pressure on both. This results in an inconsistent and disjointed pattern 
of activity developed in response to meeting the needs of the moment. At times it strives to be 
efficient while at others to be effective, often leaving workers and stakeholders confused. The 
leadership, acting in the role of "firefighter," fails to provide coherent, integrated policies to guide 
the organization as a whole because it is responding to short-term demands. Their success depends 
on the ability to get the organization to react in a timely and appropriate way to whatever is required 
of it. 22 As these organizations get pushed and pulled in various directions by stakeholders, the 
leader is often unable to develop a vision or even goals. The successful workers and managers are 
those with skills in crisis management, bargaining and negotiating, coalition formation, power 
analysis, and the ability to build and sustain a power base. 
This organization responds to stakeholder interests one at a time, depending on who has the 
strongest influence. Plans and policies are made in response to certain events or crises, which 
results in an inability to look to the future and plan coherently and logically. The work in a 
PoliticallReactive organization is based more on personal relationships than on a formalized set of 
rules and procedures. Change is usually the result of a political decision that sets a new course. 
21 Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management, p. 206. 
22 Nancy Roberts,"Public Deliberation: An Alternative Approach to Crafting Policy and Setting Direction," 1997, p. 125. 
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Inter-organizational coordination is minimal in this type of organization. This produces a 
structure with little intentional compatibility among structure, tasks, technology, training, 
information systems, and rewards. The organization is not evaluated on a specific output, but on 
how well it appears to respond to its primary stakeholder/ political authority. 
This configuration is very common in public sector organizations, which are not driven by 
competition and profit. Without a specific purpose or challenge, these organizations often fall into 
the trap of responding to "crises" rather than developing a corporate vision. Organization members 
fall into the same trap by 'just trying to survive." Some compare the decision process that results 
. from these interactions to a "garbage-can" where problems, solutions, decision-makers, and choice 
opportunities are thrown together as independent streams linked by their simultaneity in time and 
not by any logic or order. 23 Stakeholder relationships are either a one-on-one reactionary 
relationship, or they are coalition-based for the purpose of manipulating interests and achieving a 
political end. 
d Generative Configuration 
The Generative Configuration is seen as the organization of the future. It has been 
described as the "new management paradigm. ,,24 It seeks to resolve the effectiveness-efficiency 
paradox and strives toward high levels of both. This is a relatively new area of organizational design 
research, and while some organizations have made inroads in defining this organization, there is still 
a great deal of speculation as to what the final form or forms will be. 
Managers in this configuration must relying on collaborations with both internal and external 
stakeholders to address common paradoxes such as short and long-run perspectives; global and 
local considerations; individual and collective needs; social and economic concerns; security and 
freedom; change and stability; diversity and commonality ofpurpose.25 Collaboration is the process 
of decision-making among many interdependent parties. It allows organizations to work and learn 
across organizational structures requiring joint ownership of decisions and collective responsibility 
23 M.Cohen, March, and Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice." Administrative Science Quarterly, 17. 
24 A. Levine and J Luck, The New Management Paradigm: A Review of Principles and Practices, 1994. 
25 Nancy Roberts, "Organizational Configurations: Four Approaches to Public Sector General Management," p. 17 
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for outcomes. Collaborations are the key to attaining efficiency and effectiveness simultaneously. 
Effectiveness is the result of getting stakeholders to pursue common goals, while efficiencies come 
from stakeholders pursuing common means. 26 These collaborations are established to leverage 
intellect and promote "generative" learning. Generative learning is the ability to create new 
solutions to old problems rather than settle for adaptive learning which is merely finding a way to 
cope with new situations. This type of learning can only be accomplished through open dialogue 
with all the stakeholders. 
The leader in this organization assumes the role of steward, teacher, and designer. The 
leadership starts with the principle of "creative tension." Creative tension comes from seeing where 
the organization wants to be, "the vision," and telling the truth about where the organization is now, 
the "current reality." This tension can be solved in one of two ways: by raising current reality 
toward the vision or by lowering the vision toward current reality. Leading through creative tension 
is different than solving problems. In problem solving, the energy for change comes from 
attempting to get away from an aspect of current reality that is undesirable. With creative tension, 
the energy for change comes from the vision. 27 This is a subtle, but important, distinction. The 
leader then uses his various roles to create an environment where the stakeholders can work toward 
reaching this vision though generative learning. 
e. Hybrids 
Public sector organizations tend to fall into one of the four configurations, or a 
"hybrid" of these types. A hybrid occurs when an organization positions itself towards the center of 
the continuum, varying the degree of efficiency and effectiveness. Research has shown that hybrids, 
in general, are less effective than "pure bred" configurations.28 
26 Jeanne Liedtka, "Collaborating Across Lines of Business for Competitive Advantage," p. 21. 
27 Peter Senge, "The Leaders New Work: Building Learning Organizations," p. 9. 
28 Roberts, 1998, pp.29-30. 
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D. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE CONSIDERATIONS 
Organizations routinely undergo change, however, the nature, scope, and intensity of 
change varies. Organizational change is a complex issue that should be thoroughly analyzed prior to 
undertaking. Implementation methods are beyond the scope of this thesis, however, this section 
looks at the various types of change as well as considerations for managers faced with implementing 
organizational change. 
1. Types of Change 
Management should use the previously discussed principle of "creative tension" to 
determine the type of change that may be required. Strategic, or radical change has an impact on 
the whole system of the organization and ends up fundamentally redefining the organization in terms 
of its design factors. Incremental change is change that aims to improve the efficiency or 
effectiveness of the organization, but within the general framework of the existing organizational 
design. Change is also either reactive or anticipatory. Changes that are in direct response to an 
external event are reactive. Anticipatory change is done when management believes that making a 
change will benefit the organization. Combining the two dimensions produces a typology of 




Source: Mohnnan and others, Large-&aIe Organizational Change, 1989. 
Figure 2-4. Types of Organizational Change 
29 Mohnnan and others, Large-&aIe Organizational Change, 1989, p. 102. 
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Change that is incremental and anticipatory is called tuning. These changes are minor 
adjustments to the system made in anticipation of future events. Strategic change initiated in 
anticipation of future events is called reorientation. Reactive change instituted incrementally is 
called adaptation; instituted strategically is called re-creation. 30 
2. Change Considerations 
Nadler and Tushman contend that the role of leadership varies considerably depending on 
the type of change. Most incremental changes can be managed within the existing organizational 
system. However, in the case of strategic changes, the management process and structure itself is 
the subject of change, so it cannot be solely relied on to manage the change.31 
The systems model can be used as a starting point for management to appraise the current 
reality of their organization. It can also be used to build a vision for the future. The difficulty lies in 
the transition stage between the present and future. A plan must be made that takes into account 
the entire system. Any of the system variables can be manipulated to produce change in an 
organization. The congruence model must be applied to all system components because a change in 
one factor will almost always have an affect on the others. 
30 Ibid. p. 101. 
31 Ibid. p. 103 
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE NAVY MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL SYSTEM 
This purpose of this chapter is to provide an overall framework for understanding a complex 
manpower and personnel system, and to set the stage for analyzing the N13 organization. The 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), the process by which money is allocated in 
the Department of Defense (DoD), is discussed because the allocation of resources is a principle 
driving force behind Navy manpower and personnel. Second, manpower processes are described in 
terms of how they define and finance an activity's billet requirements. The personnel system 
completes the process and results in individuals physically occupying billets. After discussing the 
basic processes involved, each of the major manpower and personnel organizations are described. 
A. PLANNING, PROGRAMMJNG, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS) 
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is an iterative planning and 
control process consisting of three distinct but interrelated phases. Prior to PPBS there was no 
integrated process within DoD for systematically consolidating, reviewing, and analyzing Service 
programs. Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, established the PPBS in 1961 because it 
was difficult to relate budgets to military missions. The output of the PPBS is a comprehensive plan 
by which budgets are developed from programs, requirements, strategies, and national security 
objectives (threats) as shown in Figure (3-1). 
Source: Derived from Man wer, Personnel and Trainin 
Figure 3-1. Steps in the PPBS Process 21 
Programs 
are Developed 
PPBS is essentially a decision-making process for allocating limited resources (money) 
among many competing requirements. These requirements include manpower, technology, 
hardware, support and maintenance, procurement, and construction. PPBS differs from a 
traditional budgeting process in that rather than focusing on the existing base and annual incremental 
improvements, PPBS was intended to focus more on objectives and purposes. The system also 
brings together planning and budgeting by means of programming, a process through which plans 
are converted into time-phased and fiscally oriented programs.32 Its three primary purposes are to: 
• ensure national defense resources are allocated in a manner that produces the best 
possible military force to meet mission needs; 
• produce a realistic and responsible plan that extends more than one year into the future; 
• produce a viable budget in the context of that plan.33 
The PPBS process operates year-round with each of the three components of the process 
occurring simultaneously. PPBS is not a linear process, but an overlapping set of mechanisms for 
assessment, review, and decision focused on providing all DoD warfighting forces with the best mix 
of personnel, equipment and support attainable within fiscal constraints. Figure (3-2) illustrates the 













32 Manpower, Personnel, and Training R&D Project Officers Guide, October 1994. 
33 Manpower Fundamentals, An Indoctrination Course for CNO (Nl2) Personnel, p.l8. 
EXECUTION 
34 Thomas Simcik, "Reengineering the Navy Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) Process," Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, p. 9. 
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1. Planning Phase 
Planning, the first phase ofPPBS, examines the military posture of the United States in light 
of national security objectives and resource limitations. The primary functions in this phase include 
collecting intelligence about the military capabilities and intentions of foreign countries; evaluating 
national security threats; developing strategies to meet threats; and devising force levels to support 
strategies. The major steps in Navy planning are: 
• assess the current national security environment related to Naval forces; 
• determine Naval strategy and force levels; 
• develop force planning guidance. 
The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) becomes the final product of the planning phase and 
the foundation for the programming phase. While defense planning is continuous and iterative, the 
DPG "freezes" planning to enable construction of the Programmed Objectives Memorandums 
(POMs). 
2. The Programming Phase 
Programming is the process by which information in the DPG is translated into a financial 
plan of effective and achievable programs. During the programming phase, resources are allocated 
within the Department of the Navy (DON) based on: (1) an assessment of warfare requirements, (2) 
cons~nsus of high level personnel within DON, and (3) guidance by plans and policy decisions. The 
Programming phase results in a mid-range plan through the development of the POM, the Future 
Years Defense Program (FYDP), and the Resource Allocation Display (RAD). A description of 
these programming documents follows. 
a. Programming Documents 
(1) The Programmed Objective Memorandum (pOM). The POM is a 
detailed, six fiscal year program-specific outline of how the Navy intends to spend its money and 
allocate manpower. It covers the objectives, planned activities, and cost of each program. The first 
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two years of the POM fOIm the baseline for creation of service budgets. The POM highlights the 
first two years of the six years being programmed. For example, the information in POM 98-99 will 
be used as a baseline for the 99-00 budget (BY). Also shown in POM 98-99 is the prior year (PY) 
and current budget years (CY) (96-97) and the next four years (00-03). This six-year program is 
illustrated in Table (3) below. 
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(2) Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The FYDP is the basic DoD 
programming tool and is updated three times per year. It is a database that records, summarizes, 
and displays decisions that have been approved by the Secretary of Defense through the PPBS . 
process. The FYDP is an integrated and coordinated program document that displays forces, costs, 
manpower, procurement and construction in the approved programs. Costs of programs are 
displayed for an eight year period, while force levels are displayed for a total of eleven years. It is a 
tool that keeps PPBS management informed of what has been done in the past, and what is to be 
accomplished in the future. 
(3) Resource Allocation Display (RAD) and WINPAT. The Resource 
Allocation Display (RAD) is the DON database showing the allocation of resources according to 
Resource Sponsor, Claimant, program element, appropriation, Naval warfare task, and line item or 
activity group. The content of the RAD actually overlaps the FYDP. Access to the FYDP and 
RAD databases is provided through the Windows Program Analysis Toolkit (WINPAT). WINPAT 
is an information system that is used during the PPBS cycle. 
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b. Programming Sub-phases 
There are four sub-phases within the programming phase that are necessary for 
POM development. They are summarized in Table (3-2). 
PROGRAMMING SUBPHASE DESCRIPTION 
Appraise warfare and support programs and assess the 
Program Appraisal state of the Navy. Priorities are developed for 
programming phase 
Begins after Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 
POM Development published. Initiates further program and policy guidance for DON. Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs) are the 
major initial proposals for POM. 
Final months of POM development. Meetings held to 
POM Delivery review the POM and resolve the remaining program 
issues. 
Begins with POM submission to OSD. Review focuses 
OSD Program Review on differences between OSD staff and the services POM 
submission. Conducted by Defense Planning and 
Resource.Board. 
Table 3-2. Programming Sub-phases 
3. The Budgeting Phase 
The budget cycle is the third and final stage of the PPBS and is the process of turning the 
POM into a budget. It focuses on the two most current years in the plan. The budgeting phase is 
completed when the President sends his budget to Congress each February. The budget formulation 
and review process involves two main steps: 
• Formulation and translating program decisions and costs into proper budget format with 
review, modification, and approval from the Department of the Navy, and 
• Justification and presentation of the budget and several rounds of review and revision 
until it is finally passed by Congress. 
Claimants formulate the budget through a succession of inputs. The five primary 
appropriation categories are Research & Development, Procurement, Operation and Maintenance, 
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Military Personnel, and Military Construction. After claimants submit inputs, it undergoes several 
rounds of formal review in order for it to reflect the Navy's needs while staying within budgetary 
constraints of the national economy. The FYDP is then updated to reflect the decisions 
incorporated in the President's budget. Table (3-3) shows the major differences between the POM 
and the budget formulation. 
DIFFERENCE POM Budget 
• FOCUS • Major DON programs • Each DON program 
• RESPONSffiILITY • Resource Sponsors • Budget Submitting Offices 
• COST ESTIMATES • Gross dollars • More precise dollar figures 
• DETERMINED BY • Mission • Appropriation 
• RESULTS • Program Decision • President's Budget 
Memorandum 
Table 3-3. Major Differences between POM and Budget Formulation 
It is important to reiterate that all three cycles of PPBS are happening simultaneously and 
that each part ofPPBS has an affect on manpower organizations. Manpower has historically been 
the appropriations area typically over1oo~ed in favor of new ships, aircraft and research. However, 
without properly determined manpower requirements the most expensive and advanced aircraft, 
ships, and weapons systems would be inadequately manned. 
B. THE MANPOWER PROCESS 
. The terms manpower and personnel are often confused. While there is a distinct difference 
between them, the two terms are interrelated. In common terms, manpower deals with filling 
"spaces" (billets) and personnel deals with "faces" (manning). A simplified view of the manpower 
and personnel process is shown in Figure (3-3). 
The manpower process consists of three main steps: 1) determining and validating 
requirements, 2) authorizing requirements through funding, and 3) qualitizing billets. Once a billet is 
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The manpower system is designed to create billets, which upon being filled by trained 
personnel results, in a platform or activity being able to accomplish its mission. A simplified view of 
the manpower process is shown in Figure (3-4). The process begins by determining the 
requirements of each Naval activity. The requirement's determination process does not address the 
affordability or the feasibility of achieving manning levels, only what personnel are required to 
perfonn under warfare situations. 
The requirements determination and validation process is different for operational (ships, 
squadrons) and shore activities. For operational activities a centralized process is used with 
NA VMAC overseeing the manpower requirements determination' process. For shore activities the 
process has been decentralized to twenty-two manpower claimants. Both processes will be 
described in some detail. 
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Source: Derived from Manpower Training Course, 16-18 October, 1996 
Figure 3-4. The Manpower Process 
1. Determining Operational Requirements 
For operational activities the manpower pr~cess begins with the identification .of a Naval 
Activity's workload based on its "Required Operational CapabilitylProjected Operating 
Environment" (ROCIPOE) statement. The ROC provides a precise definition of the unit's mission 
statement. The POE is a description of the specific operating environment in which the unit is 
expected to operate. Warfare Sponsors are the originators of the ROCIPOE and are responsible for 
any revisions. Warfare and manpower experts determine the proper manpower mix when building 
this foundation document. All manpower requirements are ultimately based on the assumptions 
depicted in the ROCIPOE. 
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Ship manpower requirements are derived from empirical functional workload data in· the 
ROC. The ROC is a statement of the ship's expected mission and operational capabilities. Data 
provided in the POE is the primary source for determining squadron manpower requirements. 
Aircraft authorization, crew seat ratio, flight hours and sortie length, etc. from the POE are applied 
to determine this. The approximate number of work hours to meet these requirements is then 
determined. 
Once the basic work hours are determined, Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NA VMAC) 
applies the approved Navy standard productive workweek (67 hours productive time per week) to 
. derive the staffing required by specific skill. The manpower requirements needed to accomplish this 
workload then are identified in terms of quantity (the number of requirements) and quality (the 
paygrade plus skills required to perform that requirement). 
The Ship Manning Document (SMD), Fleet Manning Document (FMD), or the Squadron 
Manning Document (SQMD) is developed during this process depending on the type of unit. 
NA VMAC uses the information in the ROC/POE, maintenance data, various staffing standards, and 
possibly an on-site validation to create this document for an operational activity. Following analysis 
by NA VMAC the document is sent to the fleet for comment and validation. The resultant validated 
manpower requirements represent the minimum number of manpower requirements necessary to 
staff the activity to fully perform its wartime mission. Wartime manpower requirements (referred to 
as M+ 1), equate to the number of personnel required to complete 100% of the work tasked to the 
activity. Valid wartime requirements are essential so that the fleet is manned to meet any realistic 
threat, as determined in the planning phase ofPPBS. 
2. Detennining Shore Requirements 
The process of determining and validating requirements for shore activities is different from 
operational activities. The Shore Manpower Requirements Determination Process (SMRDP) 
provides a systematic means of determining and documenting minimum manpower necessary to 
accomplish an approved· activity tasking. 35 The SMRDP is working toward the goal of 
35 Chief of Naval Operations, Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, OPNA VINST 1000.16J, 
January, 1998, p. 7. 
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standardization between similar activities and has laid the burden of responsibility on the manpower 
claimant. 
The manpower claimant is responsible for the determination and validation of shore 
manpower requirements. The claimant reviews, measures, and assesses an activity's requirements 
against the activity's workload taking into account both wartime and peacetime workloads. The 
basic process of determining shore manpower requirements is as follows: 
1. Manpower claimants base manpower requirements on the directed Mission, Function, Task 
statements (MFTs) and identifY the specific workload functions that must be performed, 
including determining specific tasks, frequencies, and time to complete tasks; 
2. Determine the minimum quantity of manpower required to support activities peacetime 
workload using Industrial Engineering techniques. The standard formula for requirements 
determination is: 
Total monthly man-hours / Navy standard work-month (145.136) = Total number 
of requirements; 
3. Determine the manpower mix (military- active or reserve, civilian, or contractor); 
4. Determine wartime requirements, using peacetime requirements as a baseline (standard 
work-month changes to 249 hours); 
5. Compare results to the current Activity Manning Document (AMD) and if necessary, 
submit change requests. 36 
3. Validated Requirements 
Validated requirements are entered into the Total Force Manpower Management System 
(TFMMS) database. TFMMS is the single authoritative source of Navy manpower data. It tracks 
manpower resources, requirements and authorizations. TFMMS has three overlapping 
components: 
• The FYDP fIle reflects the quantity of budgeted End strength at an activity; 
36 Manpower Fmdamentals, An indoctrination Course for CNO (NI2) Personnel 
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• The Billet fIle shows all the current requirements/authorizations at a detailed level 
by quantity (number) and quality (paygrade); 
• The Activity fIle contains descriptive and distribution data for all activities assigned. 
4. Authorization of Funding 
Just because a valid M+ 1 requirement exists does not necessarily mean that it will be funded 
and become a billet. After a requirement is determined and validated, the resource sponsor 
determines the level of funding. The term manpower authorization describes a manpower 
requirement supported by approved funding, thereby marking the creation of a billet. 37 Authorized 
requirements are entered into TFMMS and the Activity Manning Document (AMD). Manpower 
documents, including the Ship Manpower Documents (SMD), Fleet Manpower Documents (FMD), 
and Squadron Manpower Documents (SQMD) are used to update the AMD. The AMD is a single 
source document that provides the quantitative (number) and qualitative (paygrade) manpower 
requirements (military, civilian, and contractor) and manpower authorizations (military) allocated to 
a naval activity to perform its assigned missions.38 Authorized billets are identified on the AMD by a 
Manpower Resource Code (MRC) which indicates how the billet is to be resourced (i.e., military, 
civilian). Authorizations are the basis for the planning and distribution of the Navy personnel 
inventory. Although the manpower resource sponsors are responsible for paying for each 
authorized billet, the major manpower claimants (MC) and sub-manpower claimants (SMC) actually 
determine which of the existing billets will be funded (i.e., authorized) and which will remain 
unfunded. The partial listing of resource sponsors and manpower claimants is shown in Table (3-
4). They provide billet authorization inputs to the appropriate billet writer at NA VMAC. 
37 Chief of Naval Operations, Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedrnes, OPNA VINST lOOO.16J, 
January, 1998, p. 7. 
38 Ibid. p. 10-2. 
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Resource Snonsors Major Claimants Sub-Claimants 
N4 Logistics CINCLANT AJRLANT 
N6 Staffs CINCPAC SUBPAC 
N85 Amphibious BUMED SURFLANT 
N86 Sutface BUPERS SECGRUPAC 
N87 Submarine CNO CNAJRA 
N88 Aviation 
Source: OPNAVINST 1000.16J 
Table 3-4. Manpower Resource Sponsors, Claimants, and Sub-claimants (partial list) 
Billets Authorized (BA) does not necessarily reflect the number of personnel at an activity. 
Many activities are not funded at wartime or even peacetime requirements. The Navy Manning Plan 
(NMP) represents the "fair share" of available assets and generally falls short of BA. Current 
Onboard (COB) is the number of personnel that are actually in place on a given day, which is 
generally less than NMP. Figure (3-5) illustrates this relationship between manpower and manning 
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Figure 3-5. Manpower versus Manning 
Once a billet is created, the responsibility falls on the personnel system to ensure that the 
billet is filled with a properly trained individual Officer and Enlisted Program Authority 
(OPAlEPA) are documents providing end strength guidance for the Navy. End strength refers to 
the Congressionally mandated number that the Navy must be at (plus or minus one percent) at the 
end of each fiscal year. N12 provides this year-end personnel target to strength planners and 
community managers. The OP A and EPA are the "demand signal" that the manpower system 
delivers to the personnel system to meet Navy manning requirements as constrained by the budget. 
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C. TBEPERSONNELPROCESS 
The personnel system consists of two major functional areas; Community Management and 
Distribution. The manpower process up to this point is nearly identical for officers and enlisted, 
however the personnel process varies substantially. This variation is due in large part to the size of 
the respective communities. A description of each stage in the process follows. 
1. Community Management 
The details of Community Management are discussed in the next chapter, as this is a 
primary focus of this thesis, however, the major functions are described here. The primary purpose 
of community management is to ensure that the right people, with the right training, are available to 
the distribution people in order to man the fleet. They accomplish this in a macro sense through end 
strength planning and at a micro level through the officer and enlisted community managers. 
End strength planning involves predicting and managing the Navy's total gains and losses 
for a given fiscal year in order to meet OP A/EPA end strength targets. To do this, strength-planners 
plan the number of recruits and promotions needed to offset the expected losses from retirements 
and separations. 
The Community Managers take end strength planning one step further. The Community 
Managers' primary responsibility is to shape and sustain each officer and enlisted community in 
order to meet the Navy's needs. Skill levels must be monitored and plans and policies fonnulated in 
order to shape a community. 
2. Distribution 
Distribution is the process whereby personnel managers match vacancies in field activities to 
individuals. It includes three distinct processes; allocation, placement, and assignment. Allocation 
is the process whereby personnel expected to be available within a specified period of time are 
projected for assignment into Manning Control Authorities (MCA) and also to sea or shore duty. 
MCAs are responsible for manning specific geographic regions. The MCAs are BUPERS, 
CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT and COMNAVRESFOR. Placement is considered the primary 
advocate of the activity that has the vacant billet. Placement is the process that deals with ensuring 
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that the individual assigned to the vacant billet has the proper qualifications and training, and arrives 
at the right time. Assignment is primarily concerned with job matching - matching the individual to 
the job. While efforts are made to satisfY the career and personal needs of the individual, the needs 
of the Navy often become an overriding factor in the assignment process. Detailers, as assignment 
officers are commonly known, are considered the sailors' advocate in the distribution process. 
While there are similarities between the officer and enlisted distribution systems, there are enough 
differences to warrant discussing each one separately. 
a. Officer Distribution 
The basis for officer allocation is the Officer Distributable Projections (ODPROJ) 
computer program. ODPROJ provides an "on demand" projection of officer strength by designator 
and grade, available for distribution twelve months into the future. The output of this ODPROJ in 
conjunction with billet information from TFFMS is used to develop the Navy Manning Plan -
Officers (NMPO), which sets the manning level for activities. This document is used by officer 
placement to fairly distribute available personnel to the fleet. NMP-O will specifY at what level 
various activities will be manned. For instance, submarines are typically manned at 100% of BA 
while BUPERS may only be manned at 90%. Officer placement personnel first review vacancy 
listings created by projected officer losses and NMPO guidance. They then work with the activity 
experiencing the vacancy concerning specific qualifications and training required for the billet. Upon 
completion of this process the placement .officer will "post" the vacancy to the detailer. 
The detailer provides the individual linkage in the process by dealing one-on-on~ 
with the individual. The detailer must consider numerous issues when making the assignment 
decision. Individual factors such as duty preference, grade, job qualifications, specialized training 
and continued career progression are taken into account. Administrative items such as the available 
and required enroute training and transfer cost must also be factored into the detailer's decision. 
Once the. detailer and individual officer verbally agree on a job assignment, eligibility criteria are met, 
and no other waivers are required, the detailer will issue an assignment directive, or "orders," for 
transfer. The detailer coordinates with the placement officer to ensure detachment and reporting 
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dates are acceptable to both the gaining and losing commands. The detailer then forwards the 
orders to placement for actual release. 
b. Enlisted Distribution 
The enlisted distribution process is more automated than the officer process due in 
large part to the tremendous difference in size between the communities. A key element in the 
enlisted allocation process is the Enlisted Distributable Projections (EDPROJ), which provides a 
monthly projection of personnel strength by community, available for distribution 9 months into the 
future. Its output, along with the billet information from TFMJ\.1S, is used for the development of 
. the Navy Manning Plan (NMP). Enlisted and officer allocation differ in that NMP is the primary 
tool used by the MCAs to reflect the manning priorities assigned. The MCAs are tasked to assist 
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in managing requirements for priority manning. The MCAs 
also establish detailing priorities necessary to maintain readiness and then assign priorities to billet 
vacancies. 
The Enlisted Personnel Management Center (EPMAC) functions similar to officer 
placement in that it is concerned with activity manning. EPMAC works closely with the MCAs to 
determine the assignment priority and generate requisitions for the activity. EPMAC maintains the 
Enlisted Personnel Requisition System (EPRES) which is used to provide the NMP with the 
projected inventory available for distribution and the detailers with a prioritized listing of vacancies 
by community and paygrade. The detailer uses this infonnation in one-on-one negotiations with the 
individual. Once the individual and detailer agree on a job assignment, the orders are processed to 
fill the vacancy in the fleet. 
D. MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL ORGANIZATIONS 
A functional knowledge of the manpower and personnel organizational structure is 
important in order to develop a basic understanding of the system and its many interrelationships. A 
description follows of the overall command structure and of each individual organization in 
approximate order of where it fits into the manpower and personnel process. 
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1. The Command Structure 
The manpower and personnel system command structure has undergone substantial recent 
changes, resulting mainly from the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decision to move 
BUPERS from its longstanding location in Washington D.C. to Millington, Tennessee. 
The intent of the BRAC decision was for the entire BUPERS organization to relocate as a 
cost-saving initiative. However, as the date for the move approached, it was clear that the entire 
organization would not be able to leave Washington due to the complex web of interrelationships 
that many manpower managers have with other area organizations. The initial plan was to leave 
only a few manpower personnel behind, but this number quickly escalated into the hundreds. This 
group consists primarily ofNlO, N12 and N13- organizations requiring complex interrelationships 
to accomplish their work. The Washington-based manpower organization falls under the OPNAV 
organizational structure shown in Figure (3-6). This move resulted in the disestablishment of 
BUPERS in September of 1998 and the establishment of the Navy Personnel Command 
(NA VPERSCOM) in Millington. The NA VPERSCOM organizational structure still is evolving but 
the current configuration is shown in Figure (3-7). N1 is dual-hatted as Chief of Naval Personnel 
and will remain primarily in Washington, D. C. 
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Figure 3-7. CNP and Navy Personnel Command (NA VPERSCOM) Organizational Structure 
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2. Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NA VMAC) 
NA VMAC is located in Millington, TN and reports to N12 and also to 
COMNA VPERSCOM. NA VMAC's primary responsibility is to detennine and validate fleet 
manpower requirements. They assist Warfare Sponsors in the development of the ROCIPOE 
statements, and develop and manage the SQMD, SMD, and FMD. NA VMAC assists and 
processes all changes to the AMD and is also responsible for managing TFMMS. They provide 
OPNA V support in developing policies and procedures for manpower requirements programs. 
Table (3-5) summarizes the main functions and responsibilities ofNA VMAC. 
NA VMAC FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
• Determine and validate fleet manpower requirements 
• Computes wartime (M+ 1) requirements 
• Assist Warfare Sponsors in development ofROCIPOE statements 
• Develop and manage SMD, FMD, SQMD 
• TFM:MS management 
• Assist in development of AMD and process all change requests 
• Provide OPNA V support in developing policy and procedures for manpower management 
• Perform on-site assessments for fleet and shore activities 
Table 3-5. NA VMAC Functions and Responsibilities 
3. Enlisted Personnel Management Center (EPMAC) 
EPMAC was established in 1975 because Fleet Commanders in Chiefs (FLTCINCS) 
wanted m:t agent to ensure compliance with their manning policies and to maintain personnel 
readiness within those policies. EPMAC's mission is to pr<;>vide centralized management support 
for the distribution of active duty enlisted personnel in accordance with the overall management 
policies of the MCAs. In a nutshell, EPMAC is responsible for the enlisted readiness of the fleet. 
This is accomplished through the promulgation, evaluation, and revision of the Navy Manning Plan 
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(NMP), by identifYing personnel vacancies through EPRES, and by managing the Readiness 
Information System (RlS).39 
4. Total Force Programming, Manpower and Information Resources Management 
Division (N12) 
In 1995, former eNO, Admiral Jeremy Boorda established N12 as a single point of contact 
to resolve manpower issues.4o N12 exists to oversee effective and efficient management of the 
Navy's manpower resources and requirements., and N12, as the single manpower sponsor, it 
ensures the proper number of personnel are requested in the POM process and budget preparation 
to meet specific levels of readiness. N12 is also responsible for ensuring funding is available to 
support the required manpower. They are also charged with making sure that the required funding 
to support the needed manpower is available. They work closely with Resource Sponsors (N8) to 
ensure that manpower and its funding does not drop below specified levels of readiness. The 
missions and responsibilities ofN12 are summarized in Table (3-6). 
N12 MISSIONS AND RESPONSIDILITIES 
• Provide an effective and independent appraisal capability to review program performance 
in relation to approved plans and objectives 
• Act as the single manpower sponsor with responsibility and accountability for manpower 
actions 
• Act as the Navy-wide program sponsor and resource sponsor for M&P information 
systems 
• Provide liaison and guidance for achieving Navy-wide as well as joint information sharing 
.. 
• Streamline initiatives for manpower requirements and determination 
• Become the central driver for M&P technology 
• Act as an honest broker for all manpower issues through development of independent 
analytical capability 
Table 3-6. N12 MiSSIons and Responsibilities 
39 Infonnation derived from briefing material on EPMAC (August, 1998). 
40 Manpower Fundamentals, An Indoctrination Course for CNO (12) Personnel 
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5. Distribution Department (pers-4) 
The Distribution department recently moved from the Navy Annex in Washington D.C. to 
become part of the new COMNA VPERSCOM structure in Millington, TN. Pers-4 is responisble 
for the final step in the manpower and personnel process where assignments are coordinated 
between activities and individuals. It is the department that implements many of the policies 
affecting Navy persornlel. Pers-4 main functions are as follows: 
• Implement the policies of the Community Managers (Nl3), i.e., officer and enlisted 
assignments, placement, retention, career enhancement and motivation, and career 
progression. 
• Coordinate the development of fleet and shore personnel requisitions to ensure the most 
efficient utilization of active duty personnel in support of the Navy billet structure. 
6. Center for Naval Education and Training (CNET) 
The Center for Naval Education and Training (CNET), located in Pensacola, Florida, is 
responsible for the training and education programs of Navy personnel. They coordinate with the 
fleet, Nl3, and CNRC to ensure the proper number of personnel are trained to meet fleet 
requirements. CNET does not work for the CNP, but close coordination between the organizations 
is required. 
7. Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) 
CNRC, relocating to Millington, Tennessee under the new command structure, is 
responsible for civilian recruiting and basic military training. They control the number of new 
accessions entering the Navy, and rely on estimates provided by Nl3 strength planners. 
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8. Other Manpower Resources Centers 
a. Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology Center (NPRS1) 
The Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology Center (formerly the Navy 
Personnel Research and Development Center) is in the process of relocating from San Diego, 
California to Millington, Tennessee to become part of the COMNA VPERSCOM structure. 
NPRST conducts research in manpower, personnel and training issues for the Navy and Marine 
Corps. They report to the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) and are primarily charged with 
manpower and personnel research. An important resource for manpower and personnel planners, 
NPRST research has resulted in improvements in recruiting, selection and classification, training, 
and management ofpersonne1.41 
b. Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) is a federally funded research center that 
provides analysis on a variety of Naval problems and issues. Although CNA does not report to 
CNP; it is still an available resource for manpower and personnel organizations. 
41 Infonnation from NPRST web page 
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IV. THE N13 ORGANIZATION 
The N13 organization epitomizes the "heartbeat" of the Navy manpower and personnel 
system. If not the "heartbeat", then it is certainly a key linkage in a very complex system. It is the 
critical link connecting manpower requirements with personnel distribution. This chapter provides a 
snapshot of the current N13 organization. N13 is described in some detail, particularly in terms of 
its background, mission, leadership, structure, tasks, and information and human resources systems. 
The methodology for conducting an organizational analysis ofN13 included literature and 
archival data review combined with semi-structured interviews and formal questionnaires. Excerpts 
from sixteen interviews and seven ECM questionnaires are interspersed throughout the chapter to 
enhance understanding of this complex organization based on the perceptions of leaders, managers, 
and key personnel. Respondents' names are omitted to preserve anonymity. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Until recently, the Navy Annex was the home to the Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS), 
where the majority of manpower and personnel organizations are in close proximity to each other 
and to other Navy and DoD organizations located on Capitol Hill. N13 is located in the eighth wing 
of the Navy's Arlington Annex, one floor below N12. It's location, just a short walk from the 
Pentagon, is geographically suited for the political discussions involved in arranging the Navy's 
manpower and personnel needs. It is not a modem structure, and has served as the headquarters for 
the Navy's manpower and personnel organization since World War II. From the street, these three 
and four-story buildings, surrounded by a high chain-link fence, look more like a Federal 
penitentiary than a government office building. As one N13 person stated, "There aren't any 
sculptures in our driveway." 
The view from inside the building is also stark. Private "walled" offices are reserved only 
for the select few, mostly Captains and Admirals. Less fortunate Captains and most other personnel 
are assigned to a "pooka," with portable walls dividing large rooms into multiple office spaces. This 
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arrangements tends to leave visitors in a rather confused and unwelcome state as they roam tiled 
passageways looking for indistinguishable offices in long rows of nearly identical buildings. 
The 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) decision to move BUPERS 
to Millington, Tennessee has impacted the structure and processes of the manpower and personnel 
system. 42 Many evidently do not concur with the "politics" involved in the decision and are 
anticipating major problems. The Deputy Director (N13B) stated: 
"I don't know the logic behind why they wanted to move BUPERS down there 
in the :first place, but 1 think it's going to be very challenging to provide the same 
level of service both to the member and to the Navy, and 1 think a lot of the 
communities are realizing that." 
Only those BUPERS personnel that were considered "unmovable" due to the close working 
relationships with others in the Washington area, are remaining behind under the OPNAV structure 
(see Figure 10). All others relocated in ~upport of the BRAC decision. This move not only split 
the entire manpower and personnel organization, but also resulted in a restructuring of N13 itself 
The Promotion Boards section of N13 (formerly Pers-2C) moved to Millington and has been 
realigned under NA VPERSCOM. The restructuri.ilg was described as follows: 
We're in a little bit of a transition now in a couple ways. One, the move of 
BUPERS to Memphis has caused some reorganization in the folks that were left 
behind. For example, Pers-2 used to control the selection board process from cradle 
to grave from a policy standpoint. Well, we took the Pers-2C people and did that 
and moved them into N8 so that they could physically be collocated with the Pers-3 
folks who actually run the logistics of the selection board process, because the two 
were so closely entwined. Once the board is close to getting started, they have to be 
able to walk from office to office quickly with paper; it's not electronically feasible to 
run the paper back and forth between Washington and Millington. So, that was one 
of the reorganizations that got forced upon us. 
Not only has the entire manpower and personnel organization been reorganized it has also 
been substantially downsized. The military drawdown, which began before the Gulf War and is now 
appearing to stabilize, has affected almost every military activity. Since 1990, Navy Active Duty 
42 The 1990 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act authorized base closures in 1991, 1993, and 1995. 
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end strength has been reduced by 36 percent.43 BUPERS has taken a cut across the entire 
organization. Although the number of sailors in the Navy to be managed has been reduced, the 
number of functions to be managed has remained essentially the same. As the Head, Officer Plans 
and Policy Branch stated: 
I mean what's the difference between managing 55,000 officers or 70,000 
officers. The same requirements are there. It hasn't changed. 
B. NI3 MlSSION 
Prior to looking at the N13 mission, it is helpful to first look at the mission of the parent 
organization, BUPERS. According to N13B, there are three universes in the Navy; people, 
operations, and procurement, with BUPERS controlling the "people" universe and N13 at the 
center of it. According to NIB, 
The overall purpose of BUPERS is to balance the needs of the Navy and the 
needs of the individual so that we get the right people in the right job in the right 
place with the right training at the right time. It's really a balance of getting the right 
people- we've got to recruit, push them through a training system and balance the 
needs of the individual going through that- to the needs of the Navy ... and to do that 
at the right cost ... and we really don't have all the money in the world to do 
that ... You've got to balance all three of these. 
The N13 Command brief describes N13's mission as consisting of three major 
responsibilities; 1) develop and implement personnel plans and policy, 2) monitor adherence to 
attain fiscal and End strength objectives, and 3) plan and direct career progression for officer and 
enliSted personnel. The following are the informal mission statements given by N13 personnel. 
The overall purpose of N13 would be to find and assess the best possible 
recruits, officer or enlisted, to ensure they are given the proper tools in order to do 
their jobs, to care for them as they go through their careers in terms of 
compensation and benefits and career management and to help them as they leave 
the Navy. That's from the sense of serving the customer or the member. Then we 
have a symmetrical mission of doing those same things for the Navy. We assess 
people for the Navy by ensuring the right and qualified people are sent to the proper 
places, that the communities are managed and that the force is structured possible. 
43 Office of Budget Department of the Navy, "FY 1999 Department of the Navy Budget," Sept. 1997. 
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That is basically a corollary to what you are doing for the folks turns around to be a 
benefit for the Navy. 
The overall purpose of N13 is to manage the Navy's officer and enlisted 
inventory and to set policies relating to that inventory. So, whether it's 
compensation, advancement, promotion, recruiting or high year tenure policy, all 
those various policies relate to how you manage the force. N13 is responsible for 
managing the force in its entirety ... the entire officer and enlisted forces and is also 
responsible for managing the individual skills within that. 
These informal mission statements describe what the organizational members feel is the 
primary mission of the organization. The Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13) faces 
the challenge of meeting the needs _ of the Navy and individual sailors in an austere financial 
environment. The above mission statements summarize the complexity of N13 and alludes to its 
critical role as the "heartbeat" of a larger organism, providing the right mix of personnel to meet 
defense and Naval requirements. 
C. SENIOR EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP 
The executive leadership, comprised of the Admiral (N13) and his deputy (N13B) spends a 
large portion of its time dealing with other manpower and personnel organizations. A significant 
effort is required to coordinate, seek consensus, and promulgate policies and plans among the 
various stakeholders. 
Branch heads -are given a great deal of autonomy in dealing with their area of 
responsibilities, however, policy decisions go through the Admiral. Anecdotal evidence indicates 
that past leadership may attempt to micromanage initially, but soon recognize limits regarding span-
of-control. As with all military leadership, ultimate responsibility resides with the senior person in 
the organization. 
The Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13) is traditionally a two-
star billet. There is no standard career path for this job. The current Admiral followed a fairly 
typical career path for an Unrestricted Line Officer spending most of his time in operational billets. 
During shore tours he gained some knowledge into the manpower and personnel world. Upon 
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selection to Admiral, he served a short tour as N12 until he assumed the duties ofN13. The two 
top positions, N12 and N13, have somewhat of a sequential relationship as evidenced by the 
following: 
The N12 guy is under a lot of heat from N8 (the Resource Sponsor) to get 
everything in a box- get the money the way it should be ... They can break things and 
it will never impact them (in N12). But, if you know that you're coming down here 
(N13) to receive those dollars that you programmed for a couple years previously- it 
makes you more interested in doing it correctly. Those two jobs together (NI2 and 
NI3) make or break Navy personnel. If they (NI2) don't come up with the right 
money, it's very hard for us (NI3) to implement anything down here. 
. Unfortunately, the job assignment of Admirals often is based more on politics than practicalities, so 
this is not a consistent practice. 
In contrast to the somewhat manpower experienced Director, the Deputy (N13B) is an 
aviator (helicopter pilot) with no previous manpower experience. He was ordered in as the 
Compensation Chief and then as he describes: 
I spent about 6 months upstairs as Compensation Chief (N130), and then 
through the vagaries of retirement, and them not finding who they wanted or 
needed, I ended up rolling down here. 
It is interesting to note that learning the N13 business was not the most difficult challenge for the 
Deputy Director, it was learning how things work in Washington, D.C. As he observed: 
Actually the lack of Washington experience probably hurt me more than the lack 
of personnel experience ... Most of what you're talking about is managing your 
resources, managing your people- trying to take care of your folks while also trying 
to meet the Navy's needs ... So, in a sense the actual Pers-2 (N13) stuff isn't bad. 
Once you get the buzzwords and find out the history, it's not that hard. Now, 
probably the biggest weakness is the lack of Washington experience. I don't 
necessarily know who to go to for what. So, that's where I spend most of my time 
catching up. 
The executive leadership spends a great deal of time interfacing with the various manpower 
stakeholders. The Admiral and his Deputy have neither the background knowledge nor the time to 
be familiar with all aspects of their organization. They must rely on their experts to educate them on 
issues they may not be familiar with. According to the Deputy Director: 
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Really, with the kind of people working for us here - it's kind of like on-time 
training when an issue comes up, rather than go to some course that tries to guess 
what we might be facing. . This way when an issue comes up that I'm not familiar 
with I can go find the expert and get the 15 minute course when I need it to answer 
a specific question. 
The executive staff also has several yeoman assigned to take care of the administrative 
requirements of the Admiral and his Deputy. In addition, the Admiral is assigned a Flag Lieutenant 
whose primary purpose is to coordinate the Admiral's daily schedule. 
D. N13 STRUCTURE AND TASKS 
Nl3 is a small organization of approximately 130 personnel that must interact with a 
number of external agencies to accomplish its mission. A current organizational chart was 
unattainable, however, the BUPERS phonebook adequately depicts the command structure. The 
major stakeholders are CNP, CNET, CNRC, N12 (Requirements), NIO (Budget), PERS-4 
(Distribution), and N8 (Resource Sponsors) as depicted in Figure (4-1). The organizational 
structure ofN13 is shown in Figure (4-2). 
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Figure 4-2. N13 Organizational Structure 
1. Compensation and Policy Coordination Branch (N130) 
This branch of the organization is located upstairs, away from the main activities. Their area 
of responsibility concerns compensation issues, particularly basic pay and housing allowances, 
subsistence allowance, and enlisted special pays; i.e., Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) and 
Enlistment Bonus (EB). They also have policy coordination responsibilities over medical special 
pay. This branch is responsible for many policies and programs seemingly inconsistent with the 
primary purpose ofN13, as indicated by the following: 
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We're kind of the red-headed stepchildren. We don't really fit anyplace else, but 
the compensation and policy coordination certainly has an effect on the ability to 
maintain those communities. We do a lot of interaction with the Enlisted 
Community Managers for who gets SRB and at what level, so there is a lot of 
interaction with them. 
The Compensation and Policy Coordination Branch consists of 12 officer, 4 enlisted, and 2 
civilian personnel. The basic structure of this division is shown in Figure (4-3). The Pay and 
Allowances section is responsible for the numerous special pays that are not community specific. 
This includes Basic Pay, Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), and Basic Allowance for Housing 
(BAH), Family Separation Allowance (FSA), Special and Incentive Pays, and Involuntary 
Separation pay. In addition, this section is also responsible for developing leave and liberty policy. 
The Bonus Programs section is responsible for the Enlistment Bonus (EB), Selective Reenlistment 
Bonus (SRB), and Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP). The Travel and Transportation Section 
oversees the Overseas Housing Allowance, Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), Temporary 
Lodging Allowance (TLA), Dislocation Allowance and all other travel related pay. The 
RetirediReserve section is responsible for retired and reserve pay policy, the voluntary separation· 
programs (TERA, VSI, SSB), adoption reimbursement, former spouse compensation, and 
transitional compensation for abused dependents. The Medical Programs officer is responsible for 
medical department special pays and HIV assignment policy. 
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Figure 4-3. N130, Compensation and Policy Coordination Branch Organizational Structure 
While some of these functions seem to be an obvious match for this branch, others follow 
no logical explanation. For example, the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) appears to be a misfit 
in this organization, as indicated by the following. 
I don't see why ~hat is part of our core mi!;,sion. Maybe it would be better served 
in Pers-4 (Distribution), but its not really part of their core either. .. That policy 
coordination hat is where you put everything you don't know what else to do with 
it. The core of what we do is compensation oriented and then we do have these 
litt:le policy niches that I think ended up here because no one knew where else to put 
them. I wasn't here when those decisions were made, so there may have been some 
logic behind it at the time, but I think you'd be hard-pressed now to figure out the 
logic. 
Each person is expected to be an expert in his or her particular area, and this type of work 
requires extensive stakeholder interaction. Each section has its own specific network of agencies 
where coordination and agreement are continually sought. The Bonus Programs people do a lot of 
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interaction with Pers-3. The travel entitlements, housing allowance and base pay people work 
closely with the Defense Financial Accounting System (DF AS), Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD), and with the Per Diem committee- a branch ofOSD. The pay and compensation policies 
of this branch are greatly affected by federal law, and by inter-service politics and competition. For 
example, the basic policy around sea pay is written into law in terms of the sea pay table. If they 
want to change the rate for sea pay, they must go to Congress and get the law changed, which may 
take several years. Inter-service competition also impacts this branch, because pay and entitlements 
are joint issues. All the services must reach a level of agreement on DoD policy changes. For 
example, if the Navy wants to change the sea pay tables: 
Well, even though the Air Force doesn't pay a single soul sea pay, they look at 
that and say, "We don't think you ought to-" because it might affect their recruiting. 
It might affect their ability to retain people. 
This is an area where inter-service coordination and stakeholder interests are critical. 
Coordination is essential to ensure that all stakeholder' views are considered in policy decisions. 
Policy analysis is important to ensure that the policy has the desired affect while minimizing 
unintended consequences. Problems in the past have resulted when community managers fail to 
coordinate with the Compensation and Policy Coordination branch. A lot of officer pays like ACP 
(Aircrew Pay), ACIP (Aircrew Incentive Pay), and NOlP (Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay) are 
managed by the community managers, but N130 still has a policy coordination function over them. 
The level of policy oversight is dependent on the current management. Presently, this branch is 
t~g an active role in coordinating the various pay policies used by the community managers. The 
following quotes illustrate the need for coordination among the special pay programs: 
You can call it a sanity check on what they're doing. We want to make sure that 
something one group is doing with their special pays doesn't negatively impact on 
somebody else. So ifwe're changing ACIP maybe we should look at how it affects 
the relative balance between the aviators and the SWOs. 
If they (Aviation OCM) are going to talk about changing ACIP, if they (Surface 
OCM) are going to talk about sea pay, if they (Submarine OCM) want to talk about 
changing the NOIP rate- all those things need to come through us, so that we can 
look at their impact on other pays. When we go down to the hill we can talk 
intelligently about why we want to do this or why we don't.want to do it. 
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Besides making policy decisions, much time is spent responding to questions and daily 
tasking. Answering the phone / e-mail and responding to congressional inquiries fills most of the 
hours in a day. 
2. Enlisted Plans and Policy Branch (N132) 
The Enlisted Plans and Policy branch is the largest of the four branches and is composed of 
approximately 22 officers, 33 enlisted, and 3 civilians, with several personnel dual-hatted in other 
branches. There are three sections under control of the Director, Enlisted Plans and Policy Branch: 
Enlisted Plans and Advancement, Training Coordination, and Enlisted Career Development. The 
organizational structure of this branch is shown in Figure (4-4). The branch is headed by a Captain 
and his Deputy, who is dual-hatted as N132 (Head ECM). They are responsible for providing 
oversight and coordination between the three sections. 
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Figure 4-4. N132, Enlisted Plans and Policy Branch Organizational Structure 
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a. Enlisted Plans and Advancement Section (N132C) 
The Enlisted Plans and Advancement section is composed of five personnel 
responsible for strength and advancement planning to meet the requirements in the Enlisted 
Programming Authorization (EPA). 
(1) Strength Planning. Strength planning is central to the N13 process. The 
strength planner's goal is to predict and manage the Navy's total enlisted gains and losses for a 
given fiscal year so that at the end of the fiscal year the congressionally mandated End strength 
number is reached. The key formula used by strength planners is: 
End Strength = Begin Strength + Gains - Losses 
The End Strength (number of enlisted in the Navy at the end of the year) equals 
the Begin Strength (number of enlisted at the beginning of the year) plus the "gains" (number of 
sailors produced by Recruiting Command), minus the "losses" (number of sailors lost to attrition, 
retirement, etc). 
The strength planners receive guidance from NI2 in the form of the EPA, which 
gives the desired force in terms of quantity and quality (paygrade). With this working document as 
a base, strength planners use historic ~rends and build a plan using SPAN (Strength Planning 
Analysis Model). A Strength Planner describes the process: 
I'll get where I'm going to start that year and I look at my model to tell me how 
many losses we're projecting. Retirements, attrition, EAOS (End of Obligated 
Service) losses are all projected by models and the missing number is the gains, and 
basically most of those are predicted by CNRC. I'm trying to hit a very large 
number. 
Up to this point the process is fairly straightforward, however, the process now 
becomes more complex. If the number of losses is deemed insufficient, then incentive programs 
(VSIISSB) are authorized to entice people to leave and/or SRB levels are lowered. On the other 
hand, if the losses are too great, SRB levels are adjusted in order to encourage higher retention. 
This "shaping" process is a mechanism used to balance the force structure. 
The strength plan is then shown to CNET and CNRC for their inputs and 
comments before submitting it to the Admiral (NI3) for approval. The coordination requirements 
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do not stop with CNRC and CNET. While there is no formalized chain of command, there is a 
tremendous amount of lateral coordination that is required for success. It is often these loose and 
informal relationships that have a direct bearing on the successful coordination efforts. The Strength 
Planners network is shown in Figure (4-5). The key people dealt with are N12, Resource Sponsors 
(N8), CNRC, CNET, NTC Great Lakes, and NlO (Budget), N130 (Compensation), and the ECMs. 
As the Strength Planner summarized: 




Source: Derived from interview with Enlisted StreIlooth Planner 





The Strength Planner is engaged in all three components of the PPBS. They do 
the preplanning for the POM, work with the Programmers to ensure enough money will be available 
in the out-years, and work with the Budgeters (N1O) for current year execution. The strength of 
these relationships often appears dependent on the individuals occupying the various positions as 
evidenced by the following: 
I currently enjoy a good working relationship with all these arms and it wasn't like 
that when I first got here- and that's the key. I would say that there are five 0-5s 
that keep everything running smoothly and when I first got here we didn't always 
talk and that was kind of scary. 
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(2) The Strength Planning Process. The Strength Planner deals with 
implementing policy. The planning process is centered on the budget cycle and is complex due to 
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Defense Authorization Act 
N12 provides the EPA and end strength control memos to the enlisted strength 
planner (N131 C), who then gives a revised EPA to the ECMs who check the plan and provide 
accession and promotion requirements for each community. The strength planner then submits a 
budget to NIO who combines this with the officer and non-strength related budget to build the 
actual budget submit. This budget submission goes to the Navy Comptrollers, who analyze it for· 
fiscal compliance. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) receive the Navy submission and analyze it. It is then combined with the other 
service submissions when sending the President's Budget to Congress. Once Congress approves 
the budget it becomes an approved Defense Authorization Act. 
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After the plan is approved, NlO (Budget) monitors the execution of the plan on 
a monthly basis. The goal is to fine-tune the plan throughout the year so that on September 30th the 
end strength number is reached (plus or minus one percent).44 
(3) Advancement Planning. Advancement planning is the process of 
establishing the number of enlisted personnel to be advanced to paygrades E-4 to E-9 for all ratings. 
The goal of the advancement planner is to maintain the inventory of enlisted in each paygrade while 
not exceeding end strength or budget constraints. 
The advancement planning process is the combined effort of the strength 
planner, advancement planner, and community managers. The strength planner provides the 
advancement planner with All Navy (ALNA V) end strength and advancement targets. The 
advancement planner coordinates the development of three separate plans; E-4 through E-6, E-7, 
and E-8 through E-9. For each advancement plan, projection of inventory losses, computation of 
vacancies, and the computation of advancements constrained by advancement resources is 
. ed 45 requlf . 
h. Training Coordination (N132E) 
The Training Coordination section is responsible for developing overall "A:' and "C" 
School plans. One person is assigned sole responsibility for each plan with oversight provided by 
the section head. 
(1) "A" School Planner. "A' School training provides initial rate training to 
enlisted personnel entering a rating. The "A" school plan is developed by the Training Section 
(N131E) who works closely with the ECMs, CNRC, and CNET. 
The basic input to the "A:' School plan is a five year forecast of "A:' School 
input requirements. These forecasts must ensure that there are sufficient inputs to the inventory of 
trained personnel to satisfy the EPA requirements. "A:' School planners are constrained by budget, 
school capacity, and instructor/student ratios. 
44 Infonnation derived from interviews and briefing material on Strength Planning. 
45 Na>y Personnel, Research and Development Center, ECM Tutorial, November 1994, pp. 77-83. 
57 
Release of the EPA drives the "A" School plan. The ECM develops a plan 
based on the EPA for their communities. The "A" School planner consolidates the ECM inputs as 
well as other inputs to develop an unconstrained training plan. This plan is then sent to CNET, 
where it is constrained by classroom size, number of instructors, or facility limitations. The "A" 
School planner then has the ECMs validate the constrained plan. The approved plan is then loaded 
into the Navy Integrated Training Resource and Administration System (NITRAS), and changed or 
modified as necessary throughout the execution year.46 
(2) "C" School Planner. The "C" School planner is responsible for 
developing and implementing the annual plan. "C" Schools are required when training is required 
for a particular billet or job. Training requirements for "C" Schools are based on force structure 
billets, inventory of personnel holding an Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) code, projected gains 
and losses for each NEC skill, and training for new systems and equipment. NECs are used to code 
billets and enlisted personnel. The "C" School plan determines for a given year and the next four 
years, the number of personnel that must be graduated from a "C" School granting a particular NEC 
in order to meet the number of billets requiring that NEC. 
The process begins with the development of an unconstrained plan. The "C" 
School planner develops the plan in conferences attended by ECMs, detailers, training commands, 
and resource sponsors. The training commands (CNET, AIRLANT, AIRPAC, BUMED, etc.) 
then analyze the plan and put their particular constraints on it. ECMs and Resource Sponsors then 
review the constrained plan before the "C" School planner implements the final plan. 47 
c. Enlisted Career Development (N132D) 
Community managers are the focal point for all actions that affect a. community: 
accessions, training, advancements, sea/shore rotation, retention and bonuses, career path 
development, and separation/retirement. The ECMs are responsible for the "cradle-to-grave" 
management of their communities. The Enlisted Career Development section makes up the majority 
46 Ibid., pp. 17-29. 
47 Ibid., pp. 44-64. 
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of N13 with 16 officers and 25 Technical Advisors (Tech Ads) managing all the enlisted 
communities. The Head ECM is responsible for overseeing the work of all the ECMs. Dual hatted 
as the Deputy of Enlisted Plans and Policy Branch, he is extremely busy. He relies on each ECM to 
manage their communities and bring up any major issues as they arise. 
Each officer and assistant is responsible for several related communities. The ECM 
and Tech Ads are both senior representatives from their communities who need to work closely 
together. For example, a post Department Head aviator and a senior enlisted are responsible for 
managing a group of aviation ratings. This ensures that the community managers have a good 
. understanding of the communities being managed. As noted by one ECM: 
I care about these troops that call me on the phone. A GS-13 won't ... Every 
time a kid calls me with a big career decision I feel good. 
The fundamental ECM tasks are not difficult to learn. The estimated time it takes to 
become comfortable with this job ranged from three to six months depending on prior experience. 
As one ECM stated (and subsequently echoed by others): 
ECM work is not rocket science and is easily picked up from Tech Ads that 
work for me and by just asking questions. Ninety percent of it is just common 
sense. 
The ECMS are not only concerned with meeting current manpower requirements, 
but also with shaping the community inventory to meet future requirements. The community 
managers monitor their inventory and formulate plans and policies to achieve desired goals. The 
ECMs require extensive coordination to accomplish multiple missions. They must coordinate with 
the N13 strength planner, CNRC (via the strength planner), CNET (via the training coordinators), 
and with the detailers. This coordination is a crucial linkage because ECMs are developing the plans 
and policies executed by the detailers. The detailer's recent move to Millington will present 
significant challenges to this coordination . 
.. . Now it's almost daily contact. Soon (after the move) it's going to be e-mail 
and telephone ... It's a lot easier to deal with someone when you can put a face to a 
voice. If you're just an e-mail address then it almost makes it impersonal. Yeah, it' s 
going to be a problem. It's going to be a change and everyone is resistant to 
change. 
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The organizational split has already caused a change in the way business is done. 
Paperwork routing has become a problem. Personnel requests previously hand-carried from office 
to office in the Navy Annex, must now be electronically routed outside the command. In many 
cases, additional documentation required for informed decision making, previously included in the 
routed package, cannot be included in the electronic routing.48 
"A" and "C" School planning is important to the ECM. As the caretaker of the 
ratings, the ECM is responsible for ensuring that the ratings receive the number of trained personnel 
required to meet the EPA. ECM involvement consists of three main tasks: 49 
• Developing the annual training plans 
• Changing existing plans to meet emergent issues 
• Monitoring execution of the current plan 
There are specific requirements for "A" and "C" School planning, however, there are individual 
differences in how planning actually occurs. Some use the models, while others basically use the 
past year to guide their planning. One ECM described the basic process as he viewed it. 
Past experience, current NEC inventory, and projected requirements are all 
entering arguments in the "C" school planning process ... basically boils down to 
training 33% of billet file. Planning for "A" school is relatively straightforward 
using the Skipper model. 
As observed by an N7 member privy to school planning meetings: 
Some communities are very precise. They know how many to send and they're 
honest ... Other communities- if you've ever been to one of these meetings you'd be 
stunned- will say, "J don't know- 100, sounds good." They're not precise. Some 
communities knowing that we can never send as' many as we ask for and will 
intentionally inflate their quotas. So you can see that this is not an exact science. 
Advancement planning is another periodic task required of ECMs. They work with 
the advancement planner to develop a plan to meet the advancement requirements of their 
community. As with school planning, how the advancement planning is accomplished is left up to 
the individual ECM. 
48 From interview with Deputy Director, N13B 
49 Navy Personnel, Research and Development Center, EeM Tutorial, November 1994. pp. 17,44, 77. 
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The ECMs are responsible for much more than just training and advancement 
planning. This takes up only a small part of their time. Much time is spent preparing for briefs, 
answering questions, and dealing with the day-to-day issues that affect the community. As one 
ECM observed: 
Routine processing of requests, ad hoc/member meeting attendance, phone calls, 
responding to taskers and correspondence accounts for approximately 120% of 
available time. The vast majority of remaining time is for planning, programming, 
policy review/validation, attention to community "idiosyncrasy" issues, competing 
for resources (quotas, funding, etc.), etc ... If an ECM is doing everything necessary 
and possible to support their communities (ratings, NECs, special duty 
communities) - they should never be caught up. 
3. Officer Plans and Policy Branch (N131) 
This branch is correspondingly smaller, composed of 30 mid-grade to senior officers (many 
are assigned as Additional Duty (ADDU)), and one civilian secretary .. The organizational chart is 
shown in Figure (4-7). 
Although co-located in the same room, there is minimal interaction between the Officer and 
Enlisted Plans and Policy branches. While both officers and enlisted personnel must be recruited, 
trained, detailed, promoted, retained, and retired, different methods and tools have been designed 
for each. The branches are similar in structure with many of the same functions being performed 
(i.e., aCcession, training, advancement, etc.). The two branches are also inherently different, in large 
part due to the tremendous difference in size between the communities and the population from-
which they are recruited. The following is a basic description of the three sections in this branch. 
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(1) Strength Planning. As with the enlisted process, N12 provides end 
strength requirements to N13 in the fOIm of the Officer Programmed Authorizations (OPA) to the 
officer strength planner. The strength planner then provides guidance to the individual community 
managers who institute plans and policies to achieve this number. Like the enlisted strength planner, 
historical activity (i.e., attrition, retention statistics) provides the basis for officer plans. The strength 
planner works closely with the OCMs, accessions and promotions planner to determine the 
projected losses and required gains and promotions to achieve end strength targets. 
The accession planning process begins early in the year after the community end 
strength control is received from the strength planners. Requirements (by commissioning source) 
are solicited from the community managers. A preliminary plan is then reviewed by OCMs, Warfare 
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Sponsors (N8), the Naval Academy, CNRC and CNET. Once any conflicts are resolved, the plan is 
forwarded to the Admiral (N13) for approval. 50 
(2) Promotion Planning. Officer promotion planners allocate promotion 
totals based on authorized end strength, billet requirements, and the Defense Officer Personnel 
Management Act (DOPMA). They determine the number of officers to be promoted to the grades 
of Lieutenant through Captain for the next five years. This is a vacancy driven system where the 
number promoted must be determined by estimating the number of gains required to offset losses to 
meet end strength authorizations. Promotion planners use the following formula: 
Promotions = Authorized End Strength - Begin Strength - Gains + Losses 
DOPMA constraints are set for the percentage of officers that must be 
promoted to a given rank. This percentage along with the number of required promotions 
determines the "zone" size. The zone is the size of the officer population at the rank being 
considered for promotion and is determined by lineal number seniority within that paygrade.51 
b. Officer Career Development (N132E) 
The Officer Career Development section is responsible for a variety of activities. 
The responsibilities include: 
• Develop policy on non-designator specific career issues and overall career paths 
• Plan and manage officer graduate education and subspecialty requirements 
• Coordinate and conduct annual Major Command Review board 
• Curriculum sponsor for Manpower Systems Analysis subspecialty (XX3 3 i2 
Prior to the drawdown, fourteen personnel managed the responsibilities of this 
section. Presently there are four personnel responsible for the basically the same functions. The 
shortage in personnel has reduced the efforts to the daily management of the subspecialty and 
graduate education quota systems, foregoing planning and analysis. 
50 Information derived from briefing material on Officer Strength Planning. 
51 Ibid. 
52 N13 Command Briefing material. 
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c. Officer Community Management (N132D) 
The OCMs are responsible for the shaping of the individual communities. They 
must monitor accessions, retention, career path, and any emergent community problems. The 
OCMs must also provide the strength planner with input so that accurate budgeting can be 
accomplished. 
OCMs are charged with the overall health of their communities, in terms of the 
quality of officers, their careers and career milestones, meeting end strength, retention, losses, and 
promotion fiowpoints. Each community has its own peculiarities. Some communities have too 
many people and they must address ways to entice people to leave to ensure upward mobility. 
Other communities need more people and they are primarily concerned with recruitment and 
retention. The OCMs work for the Head Officer Plans and Policy Branch and the Head OCM, who 
are supposed to coordinate and "deconflict" between the communities. They must ensure that 
something done for one community does not negatively impact another. In addition, OCMs also 
work informally for the Head Detailer and Resource Sponsor as explained below: 
So the Community Manager is really kind of triple hatted. They work for 
me, but they also have to work for their own community, as say the Aviation 
Community Manager. He certainly is working for me, but he is also working for 
Admiral McGinn in N88 and he also works for the head detailer, because that's the 
execution side of all this. To come up with policies that couldn't be executed 
wouldn't be very smart. So, he's always working those kinds of issues. He knows 
where his bread is buttered. 
I figured out a little bit on my own, but when I came here the Captain (Head, 
Officer Plans and Policy Branch) sat me down and told me some words I remember 
very clearly, that although he would write my fitness reports, realize who all your 
bosses are and remember the CNO is also an aviator and he's very interested in 
what happens to the aviation community. And that's very typical in the Surface and 
Submarine Communities as well. Talk to Submariners, they don't do anything 
without calling Naval Reactors and likewise the senior naval aviators want to try 
and direct the community and manpower is a very sensitive issue. 
Each community requires it own policies and plans due to its own unique demands. 
For instance, the community specific incentive pay, such as ACIP (Aviation C3.feer Incentive Pay) 
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and NOIP (Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay) must be monitored by the community managers to meet 
end strength controls and to meet community requirements. Like the enlisted communities, there 
are many common tasks, i.e., promotion and strength planning. There is some sharing of ideas 
between the OCMs during periodic meetings, but no standardized practices exist for accomplishing 
the required tasks. Each OCM works independently, often having to coordinate more with external 
agencies than internal. For example, the Aviation OCM coordinates extensively with Pers-43 
(Aviation detailer), N88 (Aviation Resource Sponsor), N889 (Aviation Resource Sponsor, 
Manpower and Training division), CNET, CNATRA (Chief of Naval Air Training), and CNRC, 













Figure 4-8. Officer Community Manager (OCM) Coordination Agencies 
The level of coordination is often left to the individual communitY manager. The 
aviation OCM held official quarterly meetings with the aviation detailers (prior to the move) where 
policy issues were discussed to give detailers advanced noticed of upcoming policy changes. He 
also held bimonthly m~etings with the detailers where they discussed other relevant issues. The 
aviation OCM fears that the move of the detailers to Millington will cause coordination problems: 
I think we're going to lose how policies really affect the people. I hope they 
don't. We're going to get the money and go out there and do a quarterly visit and 
brief them on that stuff Right now I don't see it as a big issue, but when I leave and 
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they leave ... hopefully we can keep the rapport going, but naturally it's going to 
disintegrate a bit. It's too far away and we'll start becoming isolated. 
Like the ECMs, much of the work of the OeM is handling emergent tasking, building briefs, 
answering phone calls, e-mail, and questions, and developing point papers. According to the 
Surface Warfare OCM: 
I spend most of my time during the day putting out fires and repeating myself 
quite a hit. How is retention in the service? Well, it doesn't really change that fast. 
But I answer that question frequently. We have a lot of Flag Officers meeting here 
in town and every one wants the similar data and everybody has their own 
questions. 
Prior to the move to Millington, OCMs spent a tremendous amount of time reacting to the 
daily issues, which precluded any sort of long-range planning. The Aviation OCM believes that 
some of this time will be reduced because of the move, due to the detailers being forced to handle 
the daily issues that the community manager currently does. This extra time may allow the OCM to 
do more of the long-range planning that they previously have not found the time for. 
They'll (the detailers) just handle it. And maybe they won't handle it the way we 
would, but there is more than one way to skin a cat. So, I think a lot of personnel 
waiver type issues will fall more on their shoulders. We'll set up the policies and 
guidelines for waivers and it will wander and we'll have to bring it back in line. 
We'll have to keep realigning ourselves. But, there's some thought that maybe now 
we'll be able to do some more bigger picture planning. 53 
4. Nuclear Propulsion Programs Management Branch (N133) 
The Nuclear Propulsion Programs Management branch serves as the single point of contact 
between CNP and the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. They are responsible for 
personnel career management policies for nuclear-trained enlisted, LDOIWarrant, and URL officers 
and consist of six officers, three enlisted and one civilian personnel. 
53 Interview with Aviation OCM 
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. This is probably the least visible of the four branches due to the nature of the Nuclear 
community. This branch was not the primary focus of this thesis, however, the organizational 
structure is shown in Figure (4-9) and a brief discussion is provided. 
N133 
Nuclear Propulsion Program 
Mgr 
I I 
N133C N133D N133E 
Nuclear Officer Program Mgr Nuclear Enlisted Program Mgr SWO (Nuclear) Program Mgr 
LCDR LCDR CAPT 
- Asst Nuc Officer (LCDR) H Asst Nuc Enlisted (L T) I • Data Analysis 
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--l Nuc Quality Orl (Enlisted) 
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Figure 4-9. N133, Nuclear Propulsion Programs Management Branch 
This branch is separated physically from the rest ofN13. They are located in the 7th Wing of 
the Annex. Their primary function is to establish and administer all personnel policies associated 
with the Navy's nuclear propulsion program. They must also plan and administer all nUclear officer 
and enlisted accession and bonus programs. They also serve as the single point of contact for all 
matters associated with the nuclear propulsion program, military Congressional liaison. In addition, 
they are responsible for administering the officer and enlisted submarine pay programs. 54 
54 From NI33 web page (August 1998) 
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The nuclear Navy is separate in many regards from the rest of the fleet, due to the political 
ramifications of nuclear power. They make no decisions without the approval of the Head of Naval 
Reactors- and this includes all personnel issues. 
These officers have spent long hours to build and maintain their databases. Due to the rapid 
turnover there is very little corporate knowledge, so they work hard to save historical data. They 
are accustomed to hard work and long hours onboard a submarine and it is no different in this 
branch. 
Nuclear programs take up a lot of additional time .. .I work from 0600-2009 
Monday through Friday and occasionally on weekends. 
Most outside observers, while maybe not liking their apparent aloofuess, concede that the ''Nukes'' 
seem to manage their communities and programs very well. 
E. THE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND MODELS 
There are numerous models and information systems available for NI3 decision-makers. 
Information systems are designed to provide personnel with access to data. On the other hand, 
models use data for a specific purpose. Manpower models are designed to help planners determine 
the numbers and types of people needed to perform specific tasks. Personnel models are used to 
predict the likely outcomes of changes to personnel policy, and assignment models are designed to 
match individuals with jobs in such a way to maximize some objective function, subject to a set of 
constraints. 55 
. The manpower and personnel information system is a complex arrangement, and has been 
upgraded and modified over time and has become a tangled web of systems added upon systems. 
This has created the need for new programs that can translate or display certain elements of the data 
from other systems. The result is an overall system that is hard to understand and gives inconsistent 
data., dependent on the individual system it was obtained from. NIB, observed: 
55 Bernard Rostker, "Human Resource Models: An Overview," Professional Paper No. 370, Center for Naval Analyses, Nov 
1982. 
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"If you have to start with a clean piece of paper this (points at diagram of 
manpower and personnel information system) is probably not what you'd draw. 
One would think that with all the technology we have today, that we should have an 
integrated Personnel and Pay system, that we should have all the information about 
people and billets, and a relational database in which you could go in and pull up 
what you wanted. I mean everything should be in one huge databank so you can 
sort whatever anyway you want to. We don't have that. We've got to go to this 
(points to diagram) to get that kind of data, and it's inconsistent." 
Each branch of N13 requires the use of models for a wide variety of purposes. There are 
manpower models to assist in strength planning and community management for both the officer 
and enlisted communities. In addition, there are also personnel models to assist in determining 
bonus levels and compensation packages. This section begins with a description of each of the 
models available to the N13 personnel. 56 After describing the "theoretical" system, N13 personnel' 
perceptions of the available technology are discussed. 
1. Available Models and Information Systems 
a. Officer Systems 
An overview of the Officer information systems and models is shown in Figure 4-
10. The Strength planning models are used in conjunction with the accession and promotion planning 
model to determine accessions, losses, and associated policies to arrive at required end strength. 
The Navy Officer Personnel Planning Model (NOPPS IT) is a tool used for developing officer 
. strength plans. It aggregates and collates inputs from the officer COn1munity managers and produces 
a detailed strength plan. It tracks inventories, losses, and promotions. 
56 Derived from briefing material on Navy Personnel Models and Informations Systems, 1998 
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Source: N13T brief on Navy Personnel Models and Information Systems 
Figure 4-10. Officer Infonnation System Overview 
The Officer Forecasting model (STRAP-O) is used with the Officer Community 
Forecasting model (SKIPPER-O) to conduct policy analysis for officers. STRAP-O provides 
analysis for' officer strength planning and community management. It uses historical loss results to 
forecast future inventory by paygrade and year group. It looks at all unrestricted line and restricted 
line to build an all-Navy forecast. In addition, it forecasts accessions required to meet end strength 
and promotions needed to fill vacancies. SKIPPER-O is a community specific model used to 
evaluate individual community strength plans and forecast accession requirements. It is relatively 
simple to use and based on continuation rates. 
For accession planning, Accession Planning Support Software (APSS) is available 
to assist in planning annual accession requirements. The Officer Promotion Planning Model 
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(OPPM) calculates promotion vacancies and projects community flowpoints based on predicted 
zone sizes. 
Two databases are commonly used by OCMs: the Officer Personnel Information 
System (OPIS), and TARGET. OPIS is a tool to provide officer planners and managers with easily 
accessible information. It provides historical information on: 
• Inventories by community, paygrade, years commissioned service (YCS), and gender 
• Promotions 
• Retention / Continuation rates 
• Losses and Gains 
TARGET enables officer planners, community managers, and analysts to query either the officer 
master file of the officer billet file data. Currently, the system is limited to only the most recent end-
of-month files for ad hoc queries. Future plans are for building a "data warehouse" which will 
provide access to historical master and billet files. 
b. Enlisted Systems 
A different set of models is used for enlisted strength planning and community 
management. Figure (4-11) is an overview of this system. Strength Planning Analysis Model 
(SPAN) combines the output from three models in generating the total strength plan and determines 
the required accessions and advancements to balance the end strength equation. 
• OSCAR (Obligated Service Contract Analysis Report): Tracks and forecasts End" 
of active obligated service (EAOS) actions by examining the actual EAOS base each 
month. Looks at first-term and career and is based on historical loss behavior at 
EAOS. 
• RETIR (Retirement Model): Forecasts retirements and Fleet Reserve transfers as 
a function of the Length-Of-Service (LOS)-eligible population during the fiscal year. 
• NET (Navy Attrition Model): Forecasts attrition losses. Attrition is based on 
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Source: N13T brief on Navv Personnel Models and Information S stems 
Figure 4-11 Enlisted Strength Planning Information System 
The Navy Enlisted Force Analysis Model (NEFAM) is a tool used for forecasting 
the enlisted force by paygrade and LOS. It is used to project the average seniority levels of the 
force and the impact of various policies on advancements and accession requirements. 
Numerous models are available to the ECMs to assist in inventory forecasting, 
accession planning, school planning, and setting policy on sea/shore rotation. Figure (4-12) is an 
overview of this system. 
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Source: N13T brief on Navy Personnel Models and fufonnation Systems 
Figure 4-12. Enlisted Community Management Information Systems 
The Skilled Personnel Projection for Enlisted Retention (SKIPPER) model enables 
ECMs to forecast community manning and accession requirements under alternative scenarios. It 
consists of three components; inventory projection, a reenlistment control model, and automated 
accession planning. The goal is to minimize the difference between authorizations and projected 
inventory. The Community Optimization Using Robust Techniques for Navy Enlisted Yields 
(COURTNEY) is used to forecast sea/shore rotations for communities. Minimized Statistics 
(MINISTATS) is used to provide summary statistical reports for enlisted ratings and programs for 
enlisted community management. The information is used in enlisted readiness briefings. Accession 
Incentive Management System (AIMS) is a flexible information delivery system that provides data 
on rating and enlistment program quotas, numbers of contracts written against these quotas, and 
previous "sales" history of these ratings and programs. TARGET is an information delivery system 
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that allows queries of the enlisted master file or the enlisted billet file and works exactly like the 
TARGET system used for officers. 
c) Compensation Models 
There are also several models available to the Compensation and Policy 
Branch. The ROGER model is used to develop the enlisted SRB program. It projects the number 
of reenlistments for alternative bonus levels. It estimates the cost of the bonus plan and projects the 
retention effect on individual skills. The results are used in SKIPPER to project skill inventories. 
The Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model forecasts the impact of compensation and 
economic factors on enlisted retention. In doing this, it controls for the impact of sea/shore rotation 
and demographic variables. It is used to analyze the retention effect of various pay and 
compensation policies, civilian economy, and retirement system changes. Compensation and Policy 
personnel use other databases (RISK and OTIS) to assist in answering Board of Correction of Navy 
Records (BCNR) and congressional questions about specific individuals or entitlements. 
2. Problems and Perceptions 
Many people familiar with the models and information systems agree that there are 
fundamental problems. While there appears to be ample models and information systems, many are 
not actually used, and the majority are out-dated and/or not user fiiendly. N13 personnel learn the 
basics of their job during turnover, and tend to use the models and databases their predecessors 
found useful. Many claim to have sufficient data, but not in the right format. There are also 
complaints that there is not enough capability to analyze the data and information. Some of the 
models are so old that to update them would be impractical, and there isn't enough money for new 
systems. 
"One of our biggest problems is trying to figure out what effect different 
programs have on human behavior. Now there are very few things harder to predict 
than human behavior. Not only that, these models need to be updated, for instance, 
the SRB model isn't working anymore. 
Historically, BUPERS has only had enough money available to maintain and in some cases 
upgrade the existing system. This is not the right approach according to NIB, "Technologists will 
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tell you that you're better off to build a new system than to try and back-fit and fix." The Year 2000 
(Y2K) problem (programming glitch that may cause many systems to crash on January 1, 2000) has 
made the Navy not able to defer, because a great deal of money must be spent just to fix that 
problem on an archaic system. Parts of the old system need to be eliminated or simplified. 57 The 
following are some of the perceptions and opinions of various personnel in N13 about the models 
they have available. 58 
• I don't profess to really understand them, but I guess I'm satisfied. 
• The models now available to the ECMs are sufficient to do the job. The 
systems do need upgrades so that different databases can actually "talk" to 
each other. 
• I am largely satisfied. The key is ensuring you know all the default settings 
and how the model uses the information to arrive at an answer. 
• I use the lllGHLANDER and OTIS databases. I was given a two hour 
training course on them when I got here. 
• I'm getting better at getting the information I need. I probably should have 
gotten more training on how to pull a lot of this stuff out. 
• The money we have gotten for the models has allowed us to sustain but not 
improve the model. In other words, if we have a minor problem with a 
model we Can go in and trouble shoot it. But if we want to add bells and 
whistles and try to upgrade it, we don't have the money for it ... We have 
Community Managers over here that are making decisions based on an excel 
spreadsheet .... there needs to be one model that can make all of the 
decisions instead of one model for each problem. 
• It's not put out in a format that's really useful. When you've got five or six 
or eight different models that you can pull from and each one gives you 
something a little different, which one do you use? And if you don't even 
understand modeling, so you don't appreciate the variables you played with 
or even know you can play with the variables, how can you determine and 
make competent decisions if you haven't been taught how to use it in the 
first place? 
57 From interview with NIB 
58 From interviews and questionnaire responses 
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F. THE PEOPLE 
Having discussed the mission, leadership, the individual branches ofN13, and technology, 
the focus shifts now to the workers themselves. This section is important in understanding N13 and 
on a bigger scale, the Navy itself There is a wide variation in the types and background of people in 
N13 depending on the particular branch and assignment. Overall, these are mainly mid-grade to 
senior officer and enlisted personnel with a great deal of experience and respect in their individual 
communities. 
There are relatively few Navy organizations that are this diverse in terms of a community 
melting pot. Each Navy community tends to attract a different sort of individual. For instance, 
submariners are generally recruited from the top of their Naval Academy class with a strong 
engineering background. On the other hand, aviators recruited from a variety of accession sources 
and academic backgrounds. Most URL officers are accustomed to working primarily within their 
community. This N13 organization brings all the communities together, requiring everyone to make 
adjustments. 
The manpower and personnel experience varies dramatically. The Fleet Support officers 
(FSO) are trained specialists in this type of work while the Staff, Unrestricted (URL) and Restricted 
(RL) Line officers who are often getting their first exposure. While the FSO often knows the 
system and has the work experience, the Staff, URL and RL officers bring community experience to 
the job. The blend of these officers is deemed important in this branch as noted by many of the 
personnel interviewed. 
The billets themselves tell a lot about the people. Most N13 billets require a subspecialty 
code (SSC), which means that people with special skills (obtained from education or experience) are 
supposed to fill these jobs. Historically, the Navy has had a difficulty meeting the Navy or DoD 
requirements for utilization ofSSC officers and also offilling SSC billets. The DoD requires that all 
officers who receive a subspecialty code through a fully funded graduate education program do a 
"pay back" tour within the next two tours. The Navy has relaxed that requirement to two shore 
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tours and still has a problem filling SSC billets and utilizing its officers. The following are the 
various ways that a SSC billet can be filled:59 
(1) Direct Fill -
(2) Closely Related Fill-
(3) Other Fill-
(4) Gapped Billet-
(5) Experience Fill -
Coded billet that is filled with an officer with that 
specific subspecialty, 
Coded billet that is filled with an officer with a 
related subspecialty 
Coded billet that is filled by an officer does not have 
a subspecialty code or a subspecialty code related to 
that specific billet, and 
Coded billet that does not have an officer currently 
assigned to it. 
Coded billet that is filled by an 
officer that holds the experience subspecialty code 
for that specific subspecialty. 
The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) computed the Billet Fill Rate as shown in Table (4-
1). It ,gives a "snapshot" view of how well the assignment process is "utilizing" the graduate 
education and subspecialty system. The Navy is able to fill less than half of its coded billets with a 
direct fill or closely related fill. The Officer Career Development section, responsible for Graduate 
Education and Subspecialty system, is currently working on this issue. This impacts N13 directly 
through the people that currently fill billets created for subspecialists. According to an N13 liaison: 
"Most of the billets are P-coded, but how often do you get an ECMwith that 
type of background? Probably about one out often." 
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Table 4-1. Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Method for Billet Fill Rate(Sept. 96 
Direct! 
Related 
The majority of the workers are military, but there are a few interspersed civilian positions. 
While military members bring the fleet knowledge and experience, civilians can often provide the 
corporate memory and expertise in other areas. They can also play important coordination roles 
with outside civilian agencies. N13 employs 12 civilians, who are divided among the various 
departments. According to NIB: 
There's a blend of military and civilian that you need to have. I think you need to 
have civilians there who know the data systems, processes and stuff and can help the 
military officers get some of the background experience. I don't know ifwe've got 
the right mix yet. 
Dealing with constant turnover is a fact of life in the military. While the FSO typically 
remains three years in a billet, the URL officers generally remain only about two years due to the 
compressed career path, which requires officers to "punch numerous tickets" on the path to 
command. Frustrated with this rapid turnover is the enlisted strength planner, an FSO who claims 
that it takes about two years for someone to become fully qualified in that job . 
. . . The warfare (URL) guys typically come in for 2 years. So right about the time 
they are cresting on that, " I know it all, I can do it all, I can pump out a Powerpoint 
slide, I can turn around a Congressional question in an hour" - they're out the door. 
60 Linda Cava1luzzo, and Donald Cyrnrot, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," Center for Naval Analyses, 
(January 1998), p.63. 
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The 1700' s (FSOs) typically come in for three years. It's not that I don't want 
warfare guys, it's just that I hate to lose them. I really want that third year. It's less 
of a burden on me if I have more people that can respond quicker. 
Some of the main side effects of constant turnover in an organization are the loss of 
historical data, continuity, and corporate memory. This is especially damaging to an organization 
that is required to make the numerous decisions and answer questions from other agencies with a 
similar lack of corporate history (i.e., Congress, DoD organizations). Lessons are continually 
learned and relearned. 
The biggest truth in Washington is that nothing is new. You see these ideas 
come up over and over again. It certainly helps to have a good filing system or to 
have some continuity. 
G. HUMAN RESOURCES 
The human resource side of the organization involves the selection, training and rewarding 
of personnel. This section will look at these three areas in some detail. 
1. Selection 
N13 selects their personnel in the same way as all other Navy organizations. They rely on 
the distribution system of detailers and placement officers to bring the best available personnel into 
the organization. This results in a quality spread based on each community's job assignment 
priorities. Differences in communities, both in terms of overall quality and career path philosophies, 
result in some N13 jobs being stepping stones for promotion and the command path, while others 
are more geared for retirement. 
The submarine community is an example of a community with both a high quality of 
personnel and a realization of the importance of these jobs. They not only send high quality 
personne~ but they also intentionally plan for a two to three month turnover to minimize the drop-
off in production that occurs during job turnover. Other communities are not as meticulous in filling 
these billets. Many community managers retire from military life after their tours in N13. This is not 
to say that these people are not performing well, but undoubtedly they are distracted from their 
work as they approach this critical time in their lives. 
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2. Training 
Training is a key ingredient of any organization. The initial training received has a 
tremendous effect on the quality of work as well as the impression of the new member of the 
command. N13 relies almost exclusively on on-the-job training (OIT) to teach new personnel the 
job. This practice of "turnover" is not just limited to N13, as the Navy job training system is largely 
built around OIT. Most jobs in ships and squadrons rely almost exclusively on OIT to bring new 
personnel up to speed quickly with the intricacies of an individual job. This requires coordination 
between the detaiIers and placement officers to ensure an adequate overlap for turnover. 
In N13, the job of Branch Head has been acknowledged as too difficult to initially assume. 
The Branch Heads have developed a system of "fleeting up" from Deputy to Director. They spend 
the first half of their tour as the Deputy learning the job, and then become the Branch Head for the 
remainder of their tour. This is prudent, but as the following N13 personnel noted, even that may be 
insufficient. 
We try and keep the continuity here. 1 was over there (Deputy) and he'll be 
there a year and when I leave he'll fleet up, because the importance of having 
continuity here is recognized. We just can't walk in here and start out fresh. You 
just can't do it. 
My Captain is getting ready to walk out the door. They new guy is fleeting up. 
He freely admits, "I don't understand half of what you do." I'll spend the next year 
ttying to get him comfortable so that he understands the other side of the job. 
The length and quality of the turnover varies widely. Generally speaking, the turnover is 
done over a period of days or weeks. This is the preferred method, but since many of the job tasks 
are only done at certain times of the year (i.e. advancement cycles), some processes are left for the 
person to learn through experience. The worst case scenario is when a billet is "gapped," meaning 
the job is vacant for a period of time. This means there is literally no turnover and the unlucky new 
arrival must rely on other personnel from the section for help. The following is a comment from an 
ECM who was the unfortunate recipient of a gapped turnover. 
1 had a no-face-to-face passdown from my predecessor. Everything I know 
about this job is based on OIT from my Technical Advisor and discussions with 
other ECMs. 
80 
Even in the best of situations, orr alone is not an ideal means of training a person new to 
this type of work. The incoming person often does not have the required background knowledge to 
understand the context of the job. An N13 person, realizing that orr was insufficient without the 
necessary job context said: 
I mean quite frankly you get a week's turnover and then you experience 
everything. 
For those previously experienced with this type work, a quick turnover may be sufficient, 
but for the rest, understanding only comes through the "trial by fire" method. N13 personnel 
typically reported taking from six months to a year to become comfortable with the new job. 
According to the Deputy Director of Manpower and Personnel (NIB), new personnel shouldn't 
have to spend that long learning how the organization and the job work. He noted: 
They spoon fed me when I came in, but I know that doesn't happen to a LCDR 
checking in down in N13. They need to understand what the whole process is and 
in detail in certain areas. 
Atypical person checking in to N13 receives very little or no indoctrination into the 
manpower and personnel world. Those without the background experience in manpower and 
personnel undergo a great deal of stress during the first six months to a year learning the buzzwords 
and basic knowledge to survive. One ECM bluntly put it: 
I've gotten no turnover or training, so I have to go find the answers myself 
Meanwhile, I'm running 35 or 40 thousand peoples-' lives and I don't know how to 
do it. 
Not only are personnel unfamiliar with the nature of manpower and personnel system, many 
are unskilled with the basic tools for survival in an environment where almost everyone is expected 
to build and give briefs, write point papers, and use and understand the various models available to 
them. Those new to the Washington environment must get acCustomed to a different way of doing 
business. Some N13 personnel check onboard with many of the skills while others check-in with 
none. 
The following comments are from various N13 personnel on the initial training. 
• It depends on how computer literate you are when you get onboard. I don't 
think it takes someone very long to figure out Travel entitlements- here's the 
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book, here's where all your references are, here's the guys you call when you 
have some questions ... Getting into learning to write Washington memos and 
those kinds of things- sometimes that's the hard part. There's an OPNAV 
Action Officer course that kind of goes over it. Hopefully you pick it up 
from someone in your section. A lot of it is just getting your work chopped 
up and sent back. .. That's one of those things that you can't just sit down in 
the classroom and learn. They certainly need to understand how what they 
do affects people. 
• They should probably have a one week training course here. They could 
teach you how to make briefs in Powerpoint, how to make spreadsheets, 
how to pull from databases. That week would save lots of pain. Also e-mail 
and how other communication systems work. The more I learn the more I 
realize I don't knOw. 
• We need to know what the budget process is, what strength planning is, why 
it's important for us. But when this should all be done is an enroute delay. 
You could get an Action Officer course, a budget course, a Manpower 
course that goes into strength planning and you'd know what the terms are. 
When my relief comes in we should get a long turnover so that we can get a 
lot of this stuff done. 
• There should be a formal training program established to assist new and 
experienced ECMs with routine and special projects associated with the job. 
• It would indeed be nice to have an ECM bible - "go-by" (even if only 
"topical" in natUre) to assist in the turn-over process. It would have to be 
similar to a 3-ring binder (since policy/systems/processes/programs, etc.) are 
in continual change. 
The orr method of job training has resulted in a lack of standardization. Although there 
are many periodic and common tasks, there are no common methods for accomplishing them. 
Rather, each person accomplishes tasks based on the training they received during turnover. As 
NIB noted: 
If the turnover is good the person who is going to do it now is going to do it just 
like the one before. Which mayor may not be the right way. We need to get down 
. how we do business. 
The lack of standardization often results in confusion, especially for a new NI3 person who 
may see several different approaches to the same work. Most ECMs agree that many of the tasks 
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should be standardized while allowing that there is some necessary variation between the 
communities. An ECM Tutorial, produced by NPRDC in 1994, was designed to be a "cookbook" 
for the community managers in how to do ECM tasks.61 However, the majority of the ECMs have 
never heard of this tutorial. Of the few that have seen it, most find it too complicated and may only 
use it as an occasional reference. The following are quotes from various ECMs in response to a 
question on standardization. 62 
• "We have basic guidelines we all use, but the individual communities dictate 
how they need to be managed. Each community has its own peculiarities. 
There are several areas (i. e. advancement planning) where standardization 
would probably be of benefit to all." 
• Since every community is different and making headway towards correcting 
individual community shortfall sometimes becomes a political endeavor, 
there appears to be different methods in the community management 
business. And yes, there should· be a standardized method to level the 
playing field. 
• Admittedly, ECMs learn orr (as passed down). However, there are 
"standard" procedures and policies (documented (Manuals, Instructions, 
Policy Decisions, NAV ADMINS, etc.), OIT "passed down" and Tasking 
"passed along") for performing many functions (advancements, accessions, 
HYTIRETIFL TRES, TERA, NEC award/removals) - and admittedly 
(again) there may be great variance in "process and decision matrix" amongst 
ECMs. Commonality of "process" is always good at the "get-go" - but many 
of the "variances" are essential for most due to the community and 
occupation supported. 
• We have basic guidelines we all use, but the individual communities dictate 
how they need to be managed. Each conimunity has its own peculiarities. 
There are several areas (i.e. advancement planning) where standardization 
would probably be of benefit to all, but for the most part, an overall policy 
of standardization would be difficult to go by. 
• ECMs and OCMs need more training to understand the output of the 
models and they need training in analysis. 
61 Navy Personnel, Research and Development Center, ECM Tutorial, November 1994. 
62 From ECM questionnaire responses 
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• Every community is different. There is no "book way." Some guys do it 
well, some don't. A lot depends on the rating. Some are easier that others in 
that they basically run themselves. Others require more work. . . Maybe there 
is a slight difference between the communities, but about 95% is common 
between the ratings and should be standardized 
3. Rewards 
All Navy organizations rely on the traditional rewards system to encourage their best 
workers. This type of system is used to reward excellent work after the end of a tour, but even this 
system has lost a lot of its luster due 'to the traditional end-of-tour awards becoming a standard 
"good-bye gift" in most communities. These long-time professionals realize that the ultimate 
extrinsic reward in the Navy is promotion, which brings both additional pay and prestige. Most of 
the officers are far enough along in their careers to assess their chances for another promotion with 
the result being that some will be more motivated than others. 
The "perks" of seniority are often considered compensation for military members. 
However, these "perks" are almost non-existent in the Washington environment. Where 
Commanders and Captains are almost treated like royalty in other Navy environments, on' Capitol 
Hill, they are 'just another 0-5 or 0-6.'.' This can be a difficult pill to swallow for someone arriving 
from the fleet. For example, even with a large portion of the Navy Annex temporarily vacant, there 
is still no parking available. Captains are complaining about not having a parking pass, while low 
ranking civilians are parking near the building. 
Intrinsically this is very rewarding work because N13 personnel feel they can have a direct 
positive impact on fellow service members' lives and careers. As one new ECM stated, "Every time 
a kid calls me with a big career decision and I can help him, I feel good." 
Many of the workers are satisfied with the job and see little difference between this and 
other commands. Everyone acknowledged that leadership at the executive and branch level is 
outstanding and generally very supportive. Many N13 personnel are quite senior and familiar with 
the intricacies of Navy life. Others, realizing that a business would not function this way are less 
than satisfied. As one ECM who questioned this mentality stated: 
Some senior guys may say, "Well, that's the way we've always done it in the 
Navy." It's like a badge of honor with them and that's just not the right way to treat 
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people ... I got no turnover, no training, no sponsor, no ''welcome aboard" from the 
boss, It surprised me ... Why am I doing this? 
H. A FINAL LOOK 
N13 is an organization going through a great deal of change. The downsizing, the split of 
BUPERS, and the reduced budget have put the organization under a great deal of stress. One N13 
personnel made the following comment 
It's like the game of "Pick Up Sticks." You can take out so many sticks without 
any apparent sign, then pull one and it collapses. Was it the one stick or all the ones 
you pulled out first? 
Many things get "dropped through the cracks." Fewer personnel are available to do the 
same number of tasks, so sometimes the volume of work to do in a day becomes overwhelming. 
The Head, Officer Plans and Policy Branch made the following comment: 
It's just like you would do on a ship or in a squadron where everybody has more 
tasks than they can do in a day. So, everyday is a thing of prioritizing and that 
which is most important to be done in a day or in a week you do that, and the other 
things suffer. 
N13 is an organization stretched to the limits. Previous "successful" methods for dealing 
with problems typically involved more money and/or personnel. These methods are no longer 
readily available and new solutions are needed to solve recurring problems. Many N13 personnel 
have ideas on how to improve their part of the organization. For example, the Assistant Bonus 
Programs officer is frustrated with the current structure because the Enlisted Bonus (EB) program 
under his control competes directly with the Navy College Fund (NCF), which is controlled by Pers-
6 in Millington. Merging these functions and providing some administrative support are two 
immediate suggestions that he feels would benefit his particular area. Ideas such as these should be 
encouraged and then, when appropriate, be incorporated into the organization. 
Chapter V uses the description provided in this chapter for viewing the N13 organization in 
a systems framework. This framework can then be used to develop a systematic plan for change, 
using the inputs of the N13 personnel. 
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v. ANALYSIS OF N13 
A. OVERVIEW 
The analysis uses the Systems model to provide a framework for including all relevant 
aspects of the N13 organization. A macro view of the organization can assist leaders and managers 
by linking and discussing factors affecting organizational performance as a holistic system. The 
systems approach allows leaders to understand how changes in one area affect other parts of the 
organization, and how strategy, structure, environment, processes and subsystems (i.e., selection, 
training, rewards, information systems, and communications) affect the culture, outputs, and 
outcomes. The Systems model can be used as a tool to assist managers to improve overall 
organizational performance. 
The Mintzberg model is also used to show the effects of the 1990s drawdown pertaining to 
N13. The Configuration model is the final framework used, due to its relevance in placing 
organizations into one of four configurations based on the level of efficiency and effectiveness. This 
last model is used to depict "Political-Reactive" types of organizations, i.e., N13. 
B. N13 SYSTEMS MODEL 
The Systems model is a framework for viewing an organization holistically in terms of its 
internal components and external environment. The model consists of design factors which are 
shaped by the organization's context, key success factors, and strategic direction. These, combined 
with organizational culture, influence outputs and outcomes. Figure (5-1) is the "generic" Systems 
model discussed in Chapter II. Figure (5-2) is an adaptation of the Systems model in terms of the 
N13 organization. Figure 5-2 translates results of analysis into the various categories captured by 
the generic model. A discussion of each component follows. 
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the work units or activities in the work flow? -Netwodes? 
-How are people held accountable 
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Figure 5-1. The Systems Model Revisited (Source: Nancy Roberts, Naval Postgraduate School, 1998.) 
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Figure 5-2_ N13 Systems Model 
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1. Context 
N13, not unlike many other DoD organizations, is greatly influenced by its external 
environment, resources and history. The political environment is particularly relevant to the context 
ofN13, including budgetary warfare and the PPBS. Competition between agencies for resources, 
power, and prestige is a strong driver in this and other bureaucratic institutions. Former Chairman 
of the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) General David Jones, described the defense budget as an 
"intramural scramble for resources." 63 This "scramble" includes the competition between the Navy 
and other services, as well as within the Navy itself, for control of dollars and political capital. For 
example, while NI (CNP) lobbies for more money for personnel, N8 (Resource Sponsors) seeks 
more money for new ships, submarines, and airplanes. 64 Congress seeks to trim costs while 
thwarting the necessity to close additional bases. 
The external economic environment also affects N13. The economic boon of the 1990s, 
and the corresponding drop in unemployment has adversely impacted recruiting and retention. This 
year the Navy predicts that it will fall well short of meeting recruiting and end strength 
requirements. 65 
The social environment of the country also impacts N13. Although the military remains a 
"trusted" institution by American society, the FY97 DoD Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (Y ATS) 
reflects a drop in propensity toward joining the military, and the Navy continues to trail the other 
services.66 Many social issues such as race, gender integration, women in combat, and even AIDS 
can influence N13 policy, planning, and criteria for success. 67 
63 Aaron Wildavsky and Naomi Caiden., The New Politics of the Budgetary Process: Addison-Wesley: New York, 19%, p. 
224. 
64 In testimony before the Subcommittee on Personnel of the Senate Armed Forces Corrunittee on 12 March 1998, Chief of 
Naval Personnel (CNP) V ADM Daniel Oliver lobbied for end strength flexibility and a fully fimded manpower account. 
65 V ADM Daniel Oliver, In testimony to Subcommittee on Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Corrunittee, March 12, 
1998, p. 4. (http:/www.house.gov/nsc/3-12-980liver-mcgann.htm) 
66 Ibid p. 4. 
67In November of 1993, the Secretary of the Navy set the "12-12-5" (12% Black, 12% Hispanic, 5% Other) goal for officer 
accessions in the Navy. The objective was to gradually reach this goal, based on Census Bureau Pl;"ojections of the population 
InlX. 
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N13 is resource constrained. The budget and available personnel are limited, which 
paradoxically contradicts the persistently high operating and personnel tempos. During the Cold 
War, resources were plentiful, and the Navy could survive inefficiencies in the system by applying 
more people and money to a problem. Inefficiencies in the system are more obvious, now that a 
substantial portion of the personnel and the budget have been eradicated. 
Organizational'history also contributes to overall context. The repetitive turnover among 
military personnel seriously difIiIses corporate memory. As several N13 personnel noted, the same 
issues keep reoccurring and personnel are continually trying to "reinvent the wheel." 
2. Key Success Factors 
Determining a complete set of key success factors is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
however, two factors are apparent. First, this is a "reactive" organization, that at the very least, 
must give the appearance of responsiveness to its many stakeholders. Second, NI3 relies on 





Figure 5-3. N13 lateral coordination 





The mission statements given by NI3 personnel describe an attempt to balance the needs of 
the fleet with individuals in a constrained fiscal environment. Reactive organizations constantly 
adjust priorities to meet emergent needs. Continually shifting priorities fragments mission clarity 
and may suboptimize perfonnance. 
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The constant turnover at all levels in the organization does not allow for the continuity 
necessary to develop and maintain organizational direction. Leaders, managers and employees are 
all busy handling daily issues and emerging crises. The point is that unless the ill effects of loss of 
corporate memory brought on by systemic turnover are not countered, then the organization must 
consign itself to relearning its mistakes over and over again. 
4. Design Factors 
a. Technology and Tas~s 
After studying the mission and tasks of N13, the following three processes are 
considered basic technologies critical to the organization. 
• N13 translates Congressional end strength requirements into plans and policies, which 
achieve the desired numbers by the end of each fiscal year. 
• N13 builds the Navy community-by-community to ensure a fleet manned to meet 
mission requirements in the ROCIPOE. This includes shaping the force by monitoring 
inputs (recruiting) and outputs (separations). 
• N13 is responsible for monitoring the career development of all Fleet personnel. This 
includes training, advancement, pay and compensation. 
The tasks vary from simple to complex, but almost all involve extensive lateral 
coordination inside and outside N13. The process of meeting end strength requirements is the fairly 
straightforward task of determining the numbers to recruit, promote, and retain in each community. 
. The· shaping of the fleet and meeting individual career needs is more difficult and complex. This 
requires some variation in the programs and policies used to affect individual behavior. 
Performing the core tasks occupies the least amount of time. The majority of the 
work hours involve handling emerging issues, which mayor may not contribute to the main 
functions. This work involves answering phone calls and e-mail, handling congressional inquiries, 
building briefs, and other management taskings. 
Although there is a great deal of similar type work being done by all community 
managers, there is minimal standardization and no apparent process for capturing and 
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communicating lessons learned or new ideas. Almost every Community Manager felt that certain 
tasks could benefit from standardization of process. 
h. Structure 
N13 is structured as a traditional military, top-down hierarchy. The branches are 
grouped partially by "market" (Officer and Enlisted Plans and Policy) and also by function (Nuclear 
Programs and Compensation). This structure appears to be misaligned with the mission and creates 
confusion as to the primary purpose of N13. The Officer and Enlisted Plans and Policy branch is 
clearly at the core of the previously described tasks and technologies. These branches are mirror 
. images of each other in nearly every way, but interaction between them is unclear. Each has a 
separate Strength Planning section, Career Development (Training) section, and Promotion 
(Advancement) section. The Compensation and Nuclear Plans and Policy branches appear to be 
supporting the primary branches in some ways, but the explicit support relationship is not clear. 
There is a strong reliance on the informal lateral coordination among personnel at 
the same level, but gaps in the vertical coordination through the chain of command. The 
organizational structure and internal lateral coordination is depicted in Figure (5-4). While 
interaction is necessary to fulfill the mission, the division of labor does not appear to promote 
teamwork. Each community is divided into officer and enlisted, then further subdivided into groups 
of related ratings. 
The physical layout of the office itself does not promote interaction. The maze of 
indivi~ual spaces generates a sense of isolationism rather than a sharing environment. Partitions. 
provide privacy while simultaneously stifling openness. 
The logic behind the N13 structure is unclear due to a lack of organizational history, 
however, the structure does not align with the purpose. For example, the Personnel Exchange 
Program (PEP) section is part ofN13, yet it does not readily contribute to the overall mission. This 
may confuse personnel already unsure of the organization's mission. 
Several liaison personnel are used to facilitate interagency coordination. There is an 
NPRST coordinator (N13C) for external research and analysis, a Policy Analysis expert (N13T), 
and a Research and Development Project coordinator. According to several long-term members of 
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N13, a large share of the reduction of N13 personnel came from a Retention section and a 
Recruiting liaison section. This has placed the few remaining liaison personnel under a tremendous 
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Figure 5-4. N13 Structure and Internal Coordination 
c. People 
Nl3 does not appear to have the right mix of personnel for the required work. This 
organization brings together a wide variety of skilled personnel, but many without the skills and 
experience for this work. Fleet Support Officers (FSO) are the best match for this work because the 
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manpower and personnel system requires specialized experience and knowledge to understand its 
complexity. FSOs likely have the education, experience, and career continuity to maintain and 
improve the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs). 
Many N13 personnel come from other Navy communities and are typically placed in 
community management or Technical Advisor (TechAd) jobs. Although these people may be 
"frontrunners" in their individual communities, they are not equipped with the necessary KSAs for 
the complex manpower and personnel system. Their value to Nt3 is in the recent fleet experience 
and knowledge of how the policies impact the people. For these officers and enlisted personnel, the 
manpower and personnel system requires learning completely new tasks, technology, culture, and 
lingo. Then, just as they begin to understand this new system, they are rotated back to their primary 
duties. Often times the two or three years spent developing new knowledge and skills during a tour 
are never used again. 
Although a detailed study of the graduate education and subspecialty systems are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, they playa major role in determining the personnel and quality mix 
of the organization. This Navy graduate education system is designed to develop officers suited for 
this type of work and the subspecialty system was developed to ensure that they are utilized. 
However, this system has been unsuccessful in assigning sufficient officers on payback tours in a 
timely manner, and it is difficult to measure whether or not the graduate education system develops 
the necessary KSAs. 
d Processes and SUbsystems 
1. Human Resource Management. N13 does not have a formal Human 
Resources Management function. N13' s selection, training, and rewarding of personnel are 
haphazard and not linked to organization performance. The selection process is left primarily to the 
distribution system to fill assignments often resulting in gapped billets or people without the 
appropriate background and skills required. 
The training system in N13 is generally acknowledged to be inadequate. 
Valuable time is being wasted and productivity lost as personnel struggle to learn a new system over 
a lengthy time period. The outgoing person is generally required to be the "human resource 
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manager," assigned as sponsor and training coordinator for his or her relief OIT is relied on almost 
exclusively to train new personnel. orr is probably sufficient training for the few already 
indoctrinated into the manpower and personnel world, however, this bombardment of tasks, 
processes, and models delivered in an unfamiliar lingo, overwhelms most personnel who do not 
have the requisite background. This "total immersion" process creates a great deal of stress on new 
personnel whose goal often shifts from mastering the job to learning "survival techniques." 
The primary trait that is rewarded in N13 (and in many other Navy 
organizations) is the ability to respond quickly and decisively. In other words, "firefighting" skills 
are sought after and rewarded. Those with the ability to get things done under a lot of stress and 
who work long hours are esteemed and valued by the organization. Other means of motivation are 
important, but by the time many senior personnel arrive at N13, they have already assessed their 
future potential in the Navy. Those on the road to command are probably the most motivated and 
consistently strong performers. However, once again, the type of behavior rewarded may be linked 
to N13's problems, i.e., short-term versus strategic thinking, and individual promotion over 
organizational continuity. Those approaching retirement may be harder to motivate. Even the 
benefits that are supposed to coincide with seniority are ignored in the Washington environment as 
senior officers work in "pookas" and fight for a parking spot. 
2. Measurement and Controls. Organizational performance is measured by 
whether or not it meets end strength goals, fleet manning levels, and individual retention statistics. 
Personnel performance is measured primarily by Fitness Reports, which does not necessarily provide 
an accurate measure of productivity. 
N13 personnel have many controls imposed upon them. They must work within 
the existing guidelines, policies, laws, rules and regulations, which act as system constraints. For 
instance, the Community Managers work within CNO guidelines for sea-shore rotation and 
Compensation personnel work within the limits of laws already enacted. These controls often 
impede the flow of the work and make change difficult to accomplish. 
3. Planning, Communication, and Information Management. It is 
common knowledge that minimal long-range planning occurs. This is an organization that reacts to 
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short-term issues, not long-term planning. This is partly due to downsizing which has resulted in 
task overload. Personnel will naturally focus on what they need to do to survive immediate crises. 
Another reason for short-sightedness is a lack of continuity and community "ownership" due to 
rapid turnover and shortened assignments. Personnel that are not expecting to be in the 
organization in the years ahead would naturally have difficulty integrating strategic perspective. 
Communication is important to the N13 organization. N13 relies on a range of 
communication mediums to coordinate work. E-mail, multiple phone lines, fax, VTC, and the 
Internet serve N13 fairly well, particularly in a downsizing environment. These communication 
mediums facilitate a demanding workload, but extensive face-to-face communications are still 
required. Face-to-face has been shown to be the most effective means of communication, followed 
bye-mail, and telephone.68 N13 relies extensively on face-to-face communication, which is a 
primary reason why the organization remained behind in Washington, D.C. There is currently a 
great deal of concern at all levels of the BUPERS organization about the move of Pers-4 to 
Millington. N13 and Pers-4 require a great deal of interaction in determining how the policies affect 
individuals in the fleet. This move separates the implementers of plans and policy from the 
executors by 850 miles and will undoubtedly result in communication problems. 
There is also an acknowledged problem with the information systems and 
models in both N13 and the entire manpower and personnel system. Information systems should be 
a tremendous asset to N13 personnel, however they mostly add to the confusion. There is a model 
for nearly every function, however, a lack of training, accurate data, and understanding of the 
models contribute to confusion and misuse. The models are reliant on data that caimot be relied on 
for accuracy, which adds a degree of uncertainty on the results. The general lack of understanding 
of how the models work can be traced to the training and selection of personnel not equipped with 
necessary analysis tools. The training is limited to orr and occasional group training. For an 
untrained person these ~odels appear overwhelming, and alternative methods often emerge to solve 
68 Linda Trevino, et aI., "Understanding Managers' Media Choices: A Symbolic Interaction Perspective," Readings in 
Managerial Communications, edited by Gail Fann Thomas, Jim Suchan, and Bob Barrios-Choplin, 2nd ed., Simon and 
Schuster Custom Publishing: Needham Heights, MA, 1997, pp. 36-38. 
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recuning problems. The fact that several Community Managers have developed their' own 
spreadsheets, bypassing existing models, speaks volumes. 
5. Culture 
The Navy culture has a tremendous affect on this organization. The people of N13 are 
mostly long time members of the Navy and have strong loyalty to their service and individual 
communities. This "culture" is one that prides an officer on being able to overcome the most 
difficult of circumstances through sheer force and determination. An officer is trained from day one 
to make the best of difficult situations without complaining. A common measure of success is being 
able to take a program in disrepair and turn it around. This is a group of officers accustomed to 
taking a new job every two or three years, with a typical "you've got it- go figure it out" turnover. 
It is not seen as abnormal that the first six months to a year in the organization is spent trying to 
figure out how to do the job, because this is a trend these officers have seen throughout their 
careers. Generally speaking, it is the brute force and effort of the individual officer that determines 
how the well the job is to be done. 
N13 is a "melting pot" of Navy communities and their associated cultures. A generally 
desired characteristic of a Navy officer is to be good at "putting out fires." The Navy tends to 
develop and reward those that operate best under stress. This "firefighting" mentality is present in 
N13, as personnel are overloaded with tasks, have no clear direction, and are forced to prioritize 
issues based on operational and administrative overload. 
The Navy also has shaped its culture through periodic job rotation. This process enforces 
learning the rules for survival, dealing with short-term issues, and making incremental changes. The 
initial stress of being thrust into unfamiliar surroundings results in a "survival instinct" where an 
officer will use all means available to appear proficient in a new job. They know that any long range 
planning will not affect them, and therefore will tend to avoid it. Military personnel are seen as 
people who are trying to make their mark quickly. The rotation system develops people with a 
mandate to do something to become visible in the eyes of superiors. 69 Officers are also generally 
69 Carolyn Ban, "How Do Public Managers Manage? Bureaucratic Constraints, Organizational Culture, and the Potential for 
Reform." Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1995, p.33. 
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conditioned to avoid a system change, because this results in more work and invalidates the hard 
effort spent mastering the existing system. 
a. Outputs and Outcomes 
N13 has three primary customer specific outputs. For Congress, the output is in 
reaching end strength limits by the end of the fiscal year and by having a Navy manned to meet all 
current threats. While meeting end strength requirements is a concrete, measurable output, 
measuring the capability of that force includes subjectivity. The output to the Fleet is officer and 
enlisted community manning levels. An erroneous assumption behind these indicators· is that 
manning levels are reflective of the size of the force that is needed. From the individual perspective, 
the output is in plans and policies that are designed to encourage retention, planned separation, and 
recruitment. This is measured primarily by retention and recruiting numbers. This performance 
indicator is "time-late," and does not explain the reasons behind individual actions. This indicator 
generally leads to reactionary behavior from manpower and personnel managers as they attempt to 
increase numbers primarily with monetary incentives. 
Serving three customers results in stakeholders who are rarely satisfied, and if they 
are, that satisfaction is fleeting. When attention is focused primarily on those with the worst 
problems, the others suffer due to lack of attention. Desired outcomes include the following: 
Congress wants full mission accomplishment and a large shore infrastructure that costs less; Fleet 
Admirals wan more technology, hardware, personnel, and training to perform missions; and Naval 
persoI1?el want reduced operation tempo and better quality of life. A persistent outcome is low . 
retention, recruiting shortfalls, and indications of an emerging hollow force. 
C.CIDUffiNTCONflGURATION 
1. Mintzberg Model 
The individual components of the N13 system comprise its depiction as an organizational 
configuration. Mintzberg's basic structural model is useful when describing the current shape. 
Downsizing has impacted the operating core, technostructure, and support staff The strategic apex 
and middle line were left largely intact in order to maintain the current branch structure, while the 
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Strength Planning and Officer Career Development sections, in particular, have been substantially 
reduced by personnel cuts. Figure (5-5) is one view of N13 using Mintzberg's basic structural 
model. 
Figure 5-5. Mintzberg's Structural Model Applied to N13 
Mintzberg's model depicts N13 as an organization out of balance. The operating core, 
while significantly reduced, has had to take on added duties of support and the technostructure. 
These personnel must now perform many of the analysis functions and administrative work that 
detracts from their primary duties. Prior to the drawdown, an entire retention shop consisting· of 
approximately 20 persons handled data analysis. This function still needs to be performed as 
retention and attrition are critical to NBs mission. Analysis can still be performed, but not without 
a cost to already overloaded personnel. The support staff is also too small to handle the existing 
administrative functions. Many officers now handle these functions themselves, distracting ·them 
from their primary duties. 
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2. Configuration model 
The Public Sector Configuration model places organizations into one of four configurations 
depending on the level of efficiency and effectiveness found in an organization. Analysis places N13 
in the political-reactive quadrant as shown in Figure (5-5). 
Adaptive 





Role: Strategic Planner/ ControUer 
High 
Figure 5-6. N13's Current Organizational Configuration 
N13 responds to stakeholder interests in an ad hoc manner, depending on who has the 
strongest influence. With its three primary stakeholders and associated outputs, it is an organization 
that· must constantly shift priorities and focus its resources on whoever is demanding the most 
attention. This forces N13 into the role of "firefighter" and helps explain why this type of 
organization struggles with both efficiency and effectiveness. 
It is difficult for leadership to develop a meaningful vision or far-reaching goals for the 
organization as it gets pushed and pulled by its primary stakeholders. Plans and policies are often 
made in response to certain events or crises, which results in an inability to implement plans for the 
future. 
The Systems and Configuration models are useful for analyzing an organization because 
they focus on the overall system, including the internal and external factors affecting it. These 
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models applied to N13 show an organization in an uncertain, political environment, lacking clear 
direction. Coupled with drastic personnel reductions and the relocation of a large part of the 
BUPERS organization to Tennessee, N13 struggles to adapt and perform in a constraint oriented 
external environment and a misaligned internal structure. Old solutions (more money and 
personnel) are no longer readily available. N13 faces the considerable challenge offormulating and 
implementing innovative solutions incongruent with its current system design factors. 
The analysis provided here should not contain any surprising revelations to those familiar 
with the organization. Rather, the models provide a framework for viewing the organization as a 
system of interrelated components and also in terms of the level of efficiency and effectiveness. 
N13, and other similarly stressed and stretched Navy organizations, can either continue to struggle 
within the confines of the present organizational design or begin to develop a strategy and plan for 
change. Application of the Systems and Configuration models can be particularly helpful to leaders 
and managers seeking improved organizations. 
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VL A FUTURE VISION FOR NI3 
This thesis has described the "current reality" of the N13 organization. Application of the 
Systems and Configuration models in the previous chapter shows areas for improvement in the 
individual components as well as the entire system. This is an important first step in the change 
process. Leaders seeking change must first have a clear picture of where their organization is today, 
in order to make plans for tomorrow. 
This chapter describes a "future vision" for N13 with recommendations to begin movement 
toward a new direction. My vision is that an organizational transformation could begin in N13 that 
could serve as a model for change throughout the Manpower and Personnel system. The 
conclusions and recommendations offered here are not meant to be conclusive, but are meant to 
open dialogue among leaders and managers on ways to improve performance. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The limitations of this study are discussed prior to drawing conclusions to put them in 
proper perspective. To thoroughly understand an organization requires in-depth knowledge at 
many levels. One week spent in Washington learning about the N13 organization is not long 
enough to conduct a complete organizational assessment. This thesis is basically a preliminary 
analysis of the entire organization and its conclusions are based on a limited number of interviews, 
and limited archival information. Information obtained from sixteen semi-structured interviews and 
seven Enlisted Community Managers' questionnaires provided only a rudimentary snapshot of the 
organization. Conclusions and recommendations may not represent diverse organizational 
perspectives due to the small sample size. 
The following three clusters of conclusions are critical to understanding N13' s current 
context and the areas where change is required. 
• The Systems model used to analyze N13's context, strategy, design elements, culture, 
outputs, and outcomes describes a reactive organization. The social, economic and 
political environment facing N13 is uncertain and complex rather than predictable and 
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stable. This conteXt has contributed to an organization with no clear direction or 
strategy. The system design elements have emerged incongruently rather than explicitly. 
The structure does not support the primary mission or teamwork, and the technology 
and tasks are complex, undefined, and not standardized. Many of the people do not 
possess the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) for the work and there is 
no formal human resources management system to adequately select, train, or reward 
personnel. The communication mediums are not fully exploited for the coordination 
required and the long range· planning is almost nonexistent. The information systems 
and models are generally out-dated, incompatible with other systems, and tend to add to 
the confusion. 
• The Configuration model places N13 into the relatively inefficient and ineffective 
quadrant termed Political-Reactive. The organization uses its limited resources to 
handle the most pressing issues, one at a time, which forces it into a "firefighter" role. 
The Mintzberg model depicts N13 as an organization out of balance. The recent 
drawdown has significantly reduced the technostructure, the operating core, and "liaison 
personnel, while basically maintaining middle and senior management structure. 
• The application of the Systems and Configuration models shows that change is needed 
to improve efficiency and effectiveness in N13, if it is to shift out of the Political-
Reactive configuration. 
" B. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following recommendations are based on several assumptions. First, it is assumed that 
Navy manning will generally remain the same or perhaps decrease slightly. The Cold War era is a 
fading memory and it is up to the remaining personnel to develop initiatives to better utilize the 
available personnel. The Smart Ship program is an example of how personnel can be reduced 
without a noticeable decrease in performance. The majority of the personnel reductions in the 
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Smart Ship program came from philosophical changes in ship policy and not technological change. 70 
Second, N13 is limited in tenns of the scope and magnitude of implementing meaningful change due 
to realities, such as officer career paths, the subspecialty system, and fiscal constraints. 
Recommendations addressing some of these issues are made for Manpower and Personnel 
leadership. Third, it is assumed that BUPERS organizations that have already moved to Tennessee 
will not return to Washington D.C. 
The leadership in the organization should consider change strategies using the Systems model as 
a framework. The recommendations summarized in Table (6-1) are starting points for dialogue, 
.and are based on some perceived weaknesses and/or inefficiencies that may need more immediate 
attention. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR N13 
The scope of this thesis is limited to describing and analyzing the current N13 organization. 
Results show that change is needed ifN13 is to become more efficient and effective. Developing a 
"future vision" is an important step in the change process. N13 leadership should develop a realistic . 
yet challenging vision that can focus the organization towards attainable improvements. The vision, 
or clearly communicated direction, would have to be linked to specific actions. For example, if the 
direction included a team approach to anticipating and solving relevant manpower and personnel 
problems, then teams would have to be established, trained, and rewarded. The remainder of this 
section concentrates on recommendations for change. 
70 Doug Brinkley, "Smart Ship Assessment: Ship's Perspective", Briefing at Naval Postgraduate School, 13 July 1998. 
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SYSTEM AREA N13 CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS 
STRATEGY! • Seta new direction, under umbrella ofNI direction. 
DIRECTION 
• Implement strategic thinking. Formulate and communicate a meaningful, relevant 
strategy for iI!tIJroving performance aligned with higher direction. 
• Determine the type of changes required (restructure, process improvement, 
training). 
• Develop a consensus for change 
• Seek solutions that focus on individual and organizational improvements. 
DESIGN FACTORS Need to be congruent 
Structure • Analyze the existing structure for alignment with mission accomplishment. Divest 
non-core mission areas. 
• Consider using teams to maximize impact of stretched personnel. 
Structure! Teams • Boldly eliminate "pookas" and create atmosphere of sharing and openness. 
• Use Fleet Support officers as manpower experts to manage the communities. 
• Use Community liaison officers to provide fleet perspective on teams incorporating 
fleet feedback. 
• Use civilians on teams to maximize continuity, perform data entry and secretarial 
functions. 
• Create a single branch for all Fleet/Community support functions. 
Tasks I Technology • Consider process redesign and development of metries to determine 
accomplishment of desired outcomes. 
Human Resource Mgnt • Create a HRMffraining Coordination Section to capture lessons learned, initiate 
critical training, and reward desired behaviors. 
Training • Design an individualized training program providing standardized and/or 
emerging needs. 
Selection • Proactive involvement in the process to ensure the best possible job match under 
the current distribution ~em constraints. 
Rewards • Update traditional reward system to motivate desired behaviors. 
Table 6-1. Summary of Change Recommendations for N13 
1. Strategy Development 
a. Strategy formulation must involve senior leaders and process owners. 
N13 needs to develop a clear direction for the 'organization that is meaningful, 
relevant, and inspiring. Caution applies. Mere promulgation of a "traditional" vision/mission/goals 
statement without linkage to direct actions will not stimulate needed change. Leaders must "carve 
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out" time for strategic thinking, communicate a platfonn or reason for change, then involve 
themselves in the ongoing more difficult process of implementation. They should consider a 
strategic issues management approach where problems and opportunities are explicitly mapped 
based on importance and urgency, and actions are assigned and tracked.7 ! The direction for N13 
needs to be aligned with the system direction given by Nl. 
h. Determine the type of change required and how to implement it 
Whether strategic or incremental change is required, either will require a 
coordinated plan, developed by using all available expertise. As discussed in Chapter II, 
"generative" learning should be cultivated through dialogue to seek new and innovative solutions to 
emerging challenges and opportunities. Generative change is difficult but might allow N13 to "leap 
frog" ahead of anticipated problems. 
c. Develop a consensus for change. 
It is essential to have a critical mass of support from the organization before 
implementing change. Top-down directed change often fails if organization members do not 
perceive the need for change or if they question management's sincerity for follow-through beyond 
rhetoric. For instance, the Navy's initiative to adopt Total Quality Management (TQM) principles 
in the early 1990s, met with only limited success due to, among other things, problems with 
implementation. In summary, organizational learning is critical ifN13 is serious about improving its 
perfonnance in meaningful ways. Developing consensus starts by accurately communicating the 
organization's reality to' all relevant members. 
d Seek solutions that focus on the individual 
N13's primary mission should be meeting the personal needs (i.e., career, 
compensation, etc.) of the individual sailors and officers. N13' s location near Congress and the 
Pentagon, and the Pers-4 (Distribution) move to Tennessee will concentrate N13's focus on 
71 Ibid pp. 104-129. 
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Congressional and Fleet needs to the detriment of individual sailors and officers. N13 should 
consider moving to Tennessee, and possibly integrating the detailers into a team-based design. The 
close coordination required between the Community Managers and detailers may not be sustainable 
given the 850 mile separation. N13 must address this critical communication gap if it intends to 
maintain or improve service and coordination. 
2. N13 Design Factors 
Organizational change involves manipulating the system design elements. Congruence 
among the system components must be considered when making changes. N13 leadership faces the 
challenging task of understanding how changing individual components impacts the system. The 
following recommendations are intended to begin a dialogue for change within N13. Each 
component must be considered individually and systematically. 
a. Structure. 
(1) Restructure to suppoq the primary mission of N13. The current 
structure ofN13 is incongruent with the mission and does not support the lateral coordination and 
mutual adjustment required. While limited in scope and detail, Figure (6-1) is one possible 
framework for restructuring. 
The proposed structure requires looking at the organization from a new 
perspective. The basic duties presently being done would be very similar, but with a clearer sense of 
unity, purpose, responsibilities, and teamwork. The recommended restructuring would serve to 
eliminate some of the middle line positions and shift the balance of the organization back to the 
operating core, which is a major strength of the organization. 
(2) The physical layout of the office should promote an atmosphere of 
sharing and openness. "Pookas" should be eliminated or modified to provide a more open space 
that promotes interaction and teamwork. This physical layout rearrangement would need to include 
affected personnel in the proposal stages, and would need to offer a better work environment. 
Unless "pooka-mentality" is dealt with, a culture based on teamwork will probably not transpire. 
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Figure 6-1. Possible Team-based Restructuring ofN13. 
(3) The branches should be reconfigured to align with the mission. 
Consider merging the Officer and Enlisted Policy branches and subdividing into broad cOmmunities. 
This configuration would promote an encompassing fleet concept. While this idea 'is likely to draw 
criticism due to the common paradigm of separating officer and enlisted in all respects, synergy and 
efficiency' may need to dominate over tradition if out-of-the-box changes are to be realized. The 
other branch would b~ the Community Support branch, whose function would be to support the 
primary branch of the organization through lateral coordination with the various communities. N13 
needs to divest non-core mission areas in order to focus on the primary purpose of the organization, 
for example, Personnel Exchange Program (PEP). 
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(4) N13 should consider using teams to concentrate perfornlance 
degraded by personnel reductions. Teams could be used to manage an entire community (e.g., 
Surface, Aviation, Submarine) including both officer and enlisted personnel. While some variation 
will obviously be required, a sharing of ideas and standardization of procedures should eventually 
increase efficiency as redundancy is reduced, and increase effectiveness as teams learn to focus on 
fleet and organizational objectives. 
A Fleet Support Officer (FSO) should be assigned "team leader" for the overall 
management of their communities and coordination between the support functions. These FSOs 
would be the resident manpower experts. They would be supported by fleet liaison personnel who 
would contribute to the team by providing a fleet perspective and feedback on plans and policies. 
The officer liaison would act as an assistant to the team leader (Officer Plans) and gradually develop 
an understanding of the manpower system while providing fleet expertise. Enlisted liaisons would 
serve as Technical Advisors (TechAds), similar to their present role, but with a key difference being 
the role as advisors rather than analysts. Civilians should be incorporated into the teams to provide 
much needed administrative support and continuity. They would be. used for data entry and 
secretarial functions that will allow the planners and policy makers time to focus on their primary 
duties. The Community Support branch should also be more team-oriented, integrating officer and 
enlisted functions, such as end strength planning. 
b. Tasks and Technology 
N13 should consider process redesign and development of metrics to determine 
accomplishment of desired outputs and outcomes. Tasks will then need to be redesigned around the 
improved and/or new processes. Many of the processes used by N13 are repeated periodically 
during a day, week, month, or year. Knowledge of the processes and tasks should not be dependent 
on a verbal passdown. These need to be documented, standardized, and incorporated into a training 
program. 
c. Human Resource Management 
N13 needs to create a HRMITraining Coordination Section to provide for the 
selection, training, and rewarding of personnel. The primary function would be to initiate a critical 
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training program, capture lessons learned, and reward desired behaviors. A customized training 
program needs to be designed to facilitate the indoctrination of personnel with varying backgrounds. 
The current method of orr adversely affects morale and productivity as employees spend months 
learning to cope. 
Due to the small size of the command, a full training department would not be 
feasible; however, this function can not be overlooked. A senior person, perhaps with a year 
remaining in the command, should be assigned the job of HRM (Training) Coordination Section 
Head as a primary duty. This section would be responsible for ensuring that each incoming 
. individual receives a personalized job-specific training program based on their previous experience 
and skill level. A training syllabus could be provided to the individual supplemented with orr. 
Other means of training should be incorporated to ensure that each new person is provided the 
knowledge needed to quickly become a productive member of the organization, i.e., training on 
teamwork. 
N13 leadership should actively involve themselves in the selection process to ensure 
the best possible job matches under the constraints of the current distribution system. This would 
require a proactive approach and systematic communications with the detailers, placement officers, 
and the job candidates themselves. 
The traditional reward system should be updated to motivate desired behaviors. 
Effective and innovative ways to motivate and reward excellence in performance for both teams and 
individuals should be part of this organization. Ask organization members what rewards and 
incentives are most meaningful to them. 
D. AREAS FOR FUTHER RESEARCH 
This study analyzed N13 and provided generalized linkage with the overall manpower and 
personnel system. The following areas would benefit from further research studies. 
• Conduct an organizational analysis on the overaU manpower and personnel system. N13 
is semi-autonomous in that the entire manpower and personnel system affects its ability to 
operate efficiently and effectively. System-wide problems complicate change initiatives in any 
111 
one organization, because the geographically dispersed autonomous organizations function 
themselves as a complex system. The Navy has operated its manpower and personnel system in 
much the same fashion for many decades evolving incrementally in response to national security 
and political pressures. 
The systems approach could be used to stimulate even wider, more fundamental 
changes to Navy manpower. Multiple design factors would need to be analyzed for the purpose 
of aligning the missions of multiple agencies. No small task, however, the field and timing may 
be ripe for Navy-wide changes. 
. • Conduct an organizational analysis of Pers-4. This area is a logical follow-on to this study 
and should be centered on the affects of the move to Millington, Tennessee, personnel 
reductions, and loss of face-to-face communications between detailers and community 
managers. Lessons learned from the move, current problems, and possible solutions would 
need to be documented and added to the findings of this study. 
• Analyze the personnel requirements of the manpower and personnel system. The findings 
of the thesis expose this area of concern in N13, which likely applies to the entire manpower and . 
personnel system. Further research could be conducted to determine: 
• to what extent is the selection, training, and experience of FSOs suitable to the 
demands of manpower and personnel management and decision-making? 
• what ratio ofFSO to URLIRL/Staff officers best fits the requirements? 
E. A FINAL WORD 
These recommendations are intended to start a dialogue for change primarily within N13, 
but also within the manpower and personnel system. The recommendations are a starting point for 
introducing needed change based on a realistic organizational assessment. This thesis has described 
the "current reality" of the N13 organization, and its relationship, although briefly, to the overall 
Naval manpower system. It is incumbent upon the leadership to provide the strategy, direction, 
communication, and means to implement needed change. Past ways of doing business are a luxury 
no longer readily available. Systemic change implies an understanding of direction, design, and 
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culture, all within the complexity of a political environment. New and innovative solutions to 
emerging problems and challenges are both possible and doable. 
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APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY OF TERMS' 
ACTIVITY MANPOWER DOCUMENT (AMDl: The qualitative and quantitative expression 
of manpower requirements (military, civilian, and contractor) and authorizations (military) allocated 
to a naval activity to perform the assigned MFTs or ROCIPOEs. It has the following uses and 
applications: 
a. As an expression of manpower needs of an activity, it is the authority used by 
CHNA VPERS and the applicable Enlisted Personnel Distribution Office to provide 
requisite military personnel distribution and Naval Reserve recall. 
b. It is the basic document for current and future peacetime and mobilization Navy military 
manpower planning in the areas of personnel strength planning, recruiting, training, 
promotion, personnel distribution, and the naval reseIVe recall. 
c. It is the single official statement of organizational manning and manpower 
authorizations (BA). 
ADDmONAL DUTY (ADDU): P~-time functional requirements to which an individual is 
assigned, and which is in addition to the primary duty. The duty mayor may not be at the 
permanent duty station. Such additional duty should not normally require less than 50 percent of 
the incumbent's time . 
. AUTHORIZATION (AUTHl: Manpower requirement supported by appropnate funding or 
meeting other established criteria. 
BILLETS AUTHORIZED CBAl: A billet for which funding has been provided for the military 
manpower space and for which the quality has been authorized by CNO as a requirement to perform 
the billet functions . 
• Sotrree: OPNAVINST 1000.16J andNPROC ECMTutorial 
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CHAIN OF COMMAND: The succession of offices from a superior to a subordinate through 
which command is exercised. 
DEFENSE OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT (DOPMA): Congressional 
legislation controlling military officer communities, specifically with respect to officer paygrades 0-4 
and above. 
DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE (DPG): Document in which SECDEF issue broad 
guidance to the services, describing the defense objectives to be supported by the forces required to 
counter that threat. 
END STRENGTH: The number of officers and enlisted requirements which can be authorized 
(funded) based on approved budgets. End strength is set forth for each activity in the FYDP. 
ENLISTED COMMUNTIY MANAGER (ECMl: Enlisted community managers (ECMs) are 
responsible for managing the "health and welfare" and career development plans of enlisted ratings, 
rates, and NECs within the manager's purview. 
ENLISTED PROGRAMMED AUTHORIZATIONS (EPA): A recurring, published document 
summarizing enlisted authorizations contained in TFMMS. The EPA projects planned 
authorizations for current and future fiscal years. 
FLEET MANPOWER DOCUMENT (FMD): Displays, in detail, quantitative and qualitative 
manpower requirements of a sea duty activity or a sea duty activity with shore duty component( s) 
that are operationally dependent upon one another and include operational units other than ships or 
squadrons. Requirements are predicated on a ROC statement under a POE, specified operating 
profile, computed workload and established doctrinal constraints. 
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FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM (FYDP): The official program that summarizes 
SECDEF-approved plans and programs for DoD. The FYDP is published at least annually. The 
FYDP is also represented by a computer database, which is updated regularly to reflect budget 
decisions reprogramming actions. 
MANNING CONTROL AUTHORITY (MCA): In the enlisted distribution system, the MCA is 
the naval authority who is tasked with determining the quantity, quality, and priority for assignment 
of personnel to all requirements within activities for which personnel distribution responsibilities 
have been assigned. This is accomplished by establishing priorities in the requisition system, 
monitoring assignments, and initiating actions to correct manning personnel deficiencies. 
MANPOWER CLAlMANT <MQ: In the Resource Management System, the major 
commanders or bureaus that are authorized manpower resources directly by CNO for the 
accomplishment of the assigned missions and tasks. 
MANPOWER REOUIREMENT: The minimum quantitative and qualitative resource needed to 
perform a specific mission, function, or task. 
NAVY ENLISTED CLASSIFICATION (NEC): The Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) code 
system supplements the enlisted rating structure in identifying special skills held by enlisted 
personnel and unique billet requirements in manpower authorizations. 
OFFICER PROGRAMMED AUTHORIZATIONS (OPA): A recurring, published document 
projecting planned officer authorizations for current and future fiscal years (budget and program 
years). Planned authorizations are summarized by designator and paygrade within designator for 
each FY and controlled precisely to the approved end strength for each of the FY s. 
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PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS): Assists the CNO 
and SECNA V in making decisions regarding the allocation of Navy resources. A formalized 
procedure by which strategy is developed in consideration of the threat. Force requirements are 
developed to support the strategy; programs are developed to provide over a period of time the 
ships, aircraft, weapons systems and manpower for the force requirements. Programs are reviewed 
for execution, estimates are refined and funds are budgeted to obtain the required manpower and 
weapon systems. At the DON level the system produces inputs to the DoD planning process, the 
DON POM, DON budget estimates and DON input to the President's budget. 
PROJECTED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (POE): The environment in which the ship 
or squadron is expected to operate, including the militruy climate (e.g., at sea, at war, capable of 
continuous operations at readiness Condition ill). 
REOUIRED OPERA TIONAL CAPABILITY (ROC): Statements prepared by mission and 
warfare sponsors which detail the capabilities required of ships and squadrons in various operational 
situations. The level of detail sets forth which weapons will be ready at varying degrees of readiness 
(e.g., perform anti-air warfare with full capability in condition of readiness III). 
RESOURCE SPONSOR: OPNA V Principle Official responsible for an identifiable aggregation of 
resources which constitute inputs to warfare and supporting tasks. The span of responsibility 
includes interrelated programs of parts of programs located in several mission areas. 
SHIP MANPOWER DOCUMENT (SMD): Quantitative and qualitative manpower 
requirements for an individual ship or class of ships and the rationale for determination of the 
requirements. Requirements are predicted upon a ROCIPOE, ship configuration, specified 
operating profile, computed workload, and established doctrinal constraints such as standard 
workweeks, leave policy, etc. 
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SHORE MANPOWER REOUIREMENTS: Claimant-approved quantitative and qualitative 
manpower requirements for a naval shore activity. 
SOUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT (SQMD): Quantitative and qualitative manpower 
requirements for an individual aviation squadron or a class of squadrons and the rationale for the 
determination of the manpower requirements. Manpower requirements are predicted upon 
statements of ROCIPOE, aircraft configuration, specified operating profile, computed workload, 
and established doctrinal constraints. 
SUBORDINATE MANPOWER CLAIMANT (SMC): A command or activity immediately 
subordinate to the manpower claimant. 
TOTAL FORCE MANPOWER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (TFMMS): The single, 
authoritative database for total force manpower requirements, and active duty MPNIRPN 
manpower authorizations and end strength. Provides storage and retrieval of historical, current, 
budget, and out-year manpower data. TFMMS provides access to current manpower data for 
























APPENDIX B. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Deputy, Chief of Naval Personnel 
Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division 
Deputy Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division 
Head, Policy Coordination Section 
Asst Bonus Programs 
Career Infonnation Team 
Head, Officer Plans and Policy Branch 
Aviation Officer Community Manager 
SWO Officer Community Manager 
Head, Officer Career Development Section 
Deputy Director, Enlisted Plans and Policy Branch / Head Enlisted 
Community Manager 
Head, Enlisted Strength Plans 
Aviation Mech Enlisted Community Manager 
Asst Aviation Mech Enlisted Community Manager 
Surface Ops Enlisted Community Manager 
Data / Research Analyst 
Policy Analysis and Evaluation 





APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL" 
This interview is being conducted as part of the research for my masters' thesis. I am 
conducting an organizational and process analysis ofN13. The primary purpose of my research is 
to analyze the structure, processes, information systems, and both internal and external relationships. 
The results of this interview will be used in explaining this organization works and where it 
fits into the overall Manpower, Personnel, and Training system. Anything said would remain 
confidential. I would like to record this interview. 
Background 
1. What is your career background? How long have you been in this position? Did you ask to 
come here? 
Mission & Structure 
2. What would you say is the overall purpose ofN13? 
3. What are your responsibilities? 
4. Can you explain to me the logic behind how the organization is set up the way it is? Is there' 
something here that you don't think belongs? Is there anything that you think should be here 
with this organization? 
5. What would you say are the "inputs" to NI3 in terms of information and resources? 
6. What would you say are the "outputs" of this organization? 
7. Who depends on these outputs? 
8. What individuals or organizations have an impact on getting your job done? 
9. How are decisions made here (i.e., meetings, top down)? 
10. Would you describe your organization as being basically autonomous or is it an organization 
with a lot of interdependence on other agencies? How well does this seem to work? 
11. How do you spend the majority of your time during a typical day? 
Infonnation Technology 
12. What are the information systems that are used by this organization? 
This interview protocol was used as a basic framework. Each interview was specifically tailored to the interviewee. 
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13. Are you able to get the information you need in order to make decisions? What information 
would you like to see that you aren't able to now? 
People & Rewards 
14. What type of specific training did you receive for this job? 
15. How long would you estimate that it would take someone to learn what they need to know in 
order to do their j0b? 
16. To what extent is turnover a problem in this organization? 
17. What kind of behavior would you like to see more offrom your subordinates? Less of? 
18. How is success measured around here? 
Miscellaneous 
19. If you were Admiral for a day and could change three things in this organization, what would 
they be? 
20. Is there anything you can think of that I should be asking in order for me to understand this 
organization? 
21. Do you have anything else you'd like to add? 
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APPENDIX D. ECM QUESTIONNAIRE 
(1) How long have you been a community manager? What communities are you responsible for? 
(2) What, if any, manpower and personnel experience did you have before coming to this job? 
How long did it take for you to get comfortable with this job? 
(3) Do you have a copy of the NPRDC ECM Tutorial (I994)? Did you ever use it? If so, how 
well does it describe the way you do business? If you don't use it, why not? 
(4) Very briefly, how do you do "I\:' and "C" school and advancement planning? Do you use the 
available models or do you basically go by past experience or some other method? 
(5) Is there a standardized method for doing Community Management? Should (or could) there 
be? 
(6) Are you satisfied with the models you have available? What would you like to be able to do 
that you aren't able to? 
(7) Do you feel that you were given adequate· training for this job? If not, what would you 
recommend for new ECMs? 
(8) Which agencies do you coordinate with most? 
(9) How do you spend the majority of your time during the week? 
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